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'We're caught in a trap; I can't walk out
because I love you too much, baby."'
INTRODUCTION

In three decisions announced the same day at the end of
the 1998-99 term, the United States Supreme Court completed a remarkable transformation in the balance of power
between states and the rights of individuals.2 More specifically, each of the decisions further limited the already truncated power of federal law to protect individuals against
states. The court, one suspects, would characterize the decisions as defining state and federal power, and the relative
extent of their sovereignty. As will be seen below, however,
these cases were not about states "rights" against overbearing federal power but, rather, about the power people
have to protect themselves against an overbearing state. In
each of these decisions, the Court shows that it is caught in
the trap of ignoring constitutional text and refusing to acknowledge the effects of its decisions on individual rights,
all because of its romance with the abstraction of state sovereignty.3
1. MARK JAMES, Suspicious MINDs (Press Music, Inc. 1969) (sung by Elvis
Presley).
2. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. (Patent Act), 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
3. This Article does not mean to suggest that the federal government always
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In the first decision, the Court held that even when
Congress purports to be enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot abrogate state immunity from suit in a federal court without Congress first proving such abrogation
was needed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In the
second decision, the Court held that there can be no constructive waiver of state immunity.5 In the last decision, it
held that state sovereign immunity need not be based on
the Eleventh Amendment at all, and states cannot be forced
to hear claims against themselves even in their own home
courts.' All three of these decisions build on a series of other
recent Eleventh Amendment cases that arose out of disputes between tribes and states, all of which barred the
tribes from adjudicating their intergovernmental disputes
with the surrounding states.!
It is apparent from the Court's Eleventh Amendment
decisions of the last decade that the Court is engaged in
writing a romance with the Eleventh Amendment as its
subject and an idealized state as its object. Like most romantic literature, it exalts an idealized version of history
and values feeling over logic. Because of this romance, state
power is ascendant. Federal power to protect the rights of
individuals and to create a uniform set of expectations
about the nature of those rights is fragmenting. That means
that the power of individuals to protect their rights and to
hold governments accountable also has begun to fragment.
The rule of law in general is weakened. Indeed, we are
caught in not one but two traps, all because of the Court's
infatuation with state sovereignty. It is time, now, not only
to recognize the nature of the traps we are in but to ask
what is the source of that infatuation.
The first trap in which all the rest of us are caught is
the decrease not only of federal power but of individual
acts in the best interest of private persons, nor that the states always fail to do
so, nor that private persons do not need protection against federal power. All
the author intends to suggest is that we, the people, need all the protection we
can get, and as the true source of all "sovereignty," (to the extent that concept
has any legitimate use) we need to keep other claims of sovereignty from interfering with such protection.
4. See College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 527 U.S. 627.
5. See College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666.
6. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
7. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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rights. Earlier Eleventh Amendment decisions from the
past few years already have brought severe blows to the
First Nations trying to assert their rights against the oftenhostile surrounding states (an almost inevitable hostility
predicated on natural jostling for power among contiguous
political entities). Now, the expectations of persons to certain economic protections-protection for their intellectual
property, protection as employees against an overbearing
employer-are no longer valid as against states, despite
these states' increasing participation in the economic life of
the nation. This lack of protection, and a concomitant lack
of federal power to extend such protection, weakens the
scope and uniformity of the privilege and immunities of
citizenship in the United States of America.
The second trap in which the Court is now caught is its
use of a style of Constitutional interpretation antithetical to
its own announced heuristic principles. In interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment while explicitly disavowing its text,
the Court has adopted an atextual style of interpretation
unanchored by anything in the words of the Constitution itself. The Court's interpretive choices are limited only by its
own ideological choices.
It is now time to assess the damage the Court's obsession with state sovereignty, as opposed to popular sovereignty, has done to our body politic. That damage occurs in
both of the two areas identified above-first, in the weakening of the uniform rule of law and the loss of security in
that rule of law for individual citizens, and second, in the
introduction of a dangerously unanchored approach to interpretation of our nation's supreme law, the Constitution.
Finally, it is time to pause to explore why the Court is so
enamored of states' rights as to be willing to inflict such
damage on us all.
I. THE GRADUAL ABANDONMENT OF THE TEXT

Each of the three decisions announced on June 23,
1999, expanded state sovereign immunity, each in its own
different way. The first case, College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board,8 concerned whether a private litigant may bring a patent infringement suit against a state. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
8. 527 U.S. at 627 (Patent Act).

20001

CAUGHT IN A TRAP

415

majority opinion acknowledged that patents are property to
be protected by due process, and further acknowledged that
Congress had the power to enact legislation to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process. He
also acknowledged that legislation enacted to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment could, in the appropriate situation,
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment's grant to states of immunity from suit.' He acknowledged that Congress did intend to abrogate that immunity in the Patent Remedy Act. °
Yet the Court held that act invalid as applied to states, because Congress failed to meet its burden of proof that the
legislation was actually needed to remedy a problem, here
the problem of states infringing patents and then denying
patent holders due process. Only if Congress marshaled sufficient evidence that states were not allowing suits against
themselves in their courts could Congress abrogate state
immunity in the federal courts."
In the companion case, also encaptioned College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board, the same plaintiff brought unfair competition
claims under the Lanham Act against the same state. In
the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia held not only that the
state could not be held to have waived its immunity from
suit by engaging in commercial activity but reached further
to repudiate the constructive waiver doctrine altogether. In
so doing, he cast doubt on several decades of the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Yet in his opinion he
held himself out to be the champion of stare decisis.
Finally, in Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy's opinion
jettisoned the Eleventh Amendment altogether as the
source for state sovereign immunity or as a basis for discovering the limitations of that doctrine. 3 In Alden, the Court
held that one cannot bring a federal claim against a state in
the state's own courts either. It now appears that unless
Congress can satisfy a skeptical Court that it enacted legislation that was sincerely and carefully crafted to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, no person can ever sue a state
anywhere against the state's will. That result is a far cry
9. See id. at 637.
10. See id. at 635.
11. See id. at 643.
12. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
13. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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from the results mandated by any reading of the Eleventh
Amendment.
The unanchored reading of the Eleventh Amendment
these decisions exhibit arises out of a series of earlier
choices the Court made. The amendment's text is open to
two readings without doing violence to the words themselves. One, which I have elsewhere called the "contextual"
reading, reads the amendment in the context of Article III
(which it was, after all, intended to amend) in such a way as
to bar only suits against states founded on diversity jurisdiction. The other reading, the "acontextual" reading, reads
the amendment to bar all suits against states brought by
citizens of other states; it is this latter reading the Court
chose. Having chosen that reading, the Court found its literal application to be odd; the Court could not accept barring suits by citizen of other states, but not suits by a
state's own citizens. Rather than repudiate the acontextual
reading, however, the Court instead began the process, now
apparently complete, that repudiated any attempt to read
the text at all. Instead, the Court has chosen a romantic
reading of the amendment that depends not on the written
Constitution but on the unwritten "spirit of the age" of the
founding era.
A. Reading the Eleventh Amendment
How did we get to this point, where states are unaccountable for even intentional violation of federally protected rights and intentional interference with federal law?
Surely the Eleventh Amendment itself does not require
such a result. Justice Kennedy, however, in one of the
Court's recent opinions expanding state immunity at the
expense of weaker parties, pointed out quite clearly:
The Court's recognition of sovereign immunity has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh Amendment.
To respect the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying, we have extended a State's protection
from suit to suits brought by the State's own citizens. Furthermore, the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in jeopardy whether or not
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the suit is based on diversity jurisdiction. 4

That is to say, the Eleventh Amendment has been replaced with a much broader and largely undefined "concept," which the text only evidences or exemplifies. As Justice Stevens pointed out a decade ago, "this Court's
decisions make clear that much of our state immunity doctrine has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial
power contained in the Eleventh Amendment." 5 Current
state immunity doctrine also has absolutely nothing to do
with simplicity or logical coherence.
The seemingly limitless expansion of the Eleventh
Amendment and the increasing complexity of its doctrine
can be traced to a choice between two alternative readings
of that amendment. One, the acontextual, appears to be the
Court's chosen reading, but another textually faithful alternative is to read the amendment in context with the entirety of the Constitution, especially the parts of Article III
the Eleventh Amendment in fact amended. Had the Court
relied on this contextual reading, much of the complexity
and all of the unfairness of current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine could have been avoided.
The starting point for any reading of the Eleventh
Amendment is, of course, the text itself. The amendment in
its entirety reads, "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." 6
The amendment's language is straightforward and concrete, with none of the grand abstractions found in phrases
like "due process of law" or "cruel and unusual punishment."' However, the text, though specific, is also equivocal, capable of two different readings. The most obvious
reading is the acontextual reading, and it yields anomalous,
even absurd results. The Court's choice to rely on that obvious reading has led it into the traps mentioned above. In
fact, that choice has led the Court to abandon the text alto14. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997) (emphasis added).
15. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
17. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, & VIII.
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gether.
1. The acontextual reading. The acontextual reading
takes the language of the amendment seriously, but it does
so without regard for how it fits with the rest of the
Constitution, especially Article III. That reading begins
with the observation that the amendment, first, is a limit
on the federal judiciary's power to hear and decide certain
kinds of cases. It prohibits federal judges from deciding
cases in which the defendant is a state, and the plaintiff is a
citizen of another state or another nation altogether. The
language appears to be simple. 8 If the state of New Jersey
is the plaintiff, the amendment is irrelevant. If the state of
New Jersey is the defendant, one must look at the identity
of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey, is
another state or is another sovereign that is part of the
United States, 9 is the United States, or is a foreign state,
then the amendment does not apply. Only if the plaintiff is,
for example, from Pennsylvania, does the amendment
apply. Or at least that is what the language appears to say,
and say rather unequivocally.
That reading seems to create an odd result, however.
But for the amendment, a citizen of Pennsylvania might
have two jurisdictional bases for a suit against the state of
New Jersey-what we normally call "diversity of citizenship""0 and also what we normally call a "federal question."
If the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit by that citizen of
Pennsylvania against the state of New Jersey, no matter
the jurisdictional basis, then the federal question suit is
barred as well as that founded on diverse citizenship. On
the other hand, while a citizen of New Jersey could not sue
her own state because of diverse citizenship, she would remain free to sue her state if it violated federal law. Thus the
strange and seemingly unjust result would be that if New
Jersey violates federal law and hurts two persons, one a
citizen of New Jersey and one of Pennsylvania, only the
former and not the latter could bring suit in federal court.
18. It is, however, ambiguous-thus the two readings, the "acontextual" and

the "contextual."
19. For example, a "domestic dependent nation," such as a federally recognized Native American tribe, one of the First Nations.
20. As noted below, there actually is no single jurisdictional basis one could
call "diversity of citizenship"--there are several such bases, and that fact is a
key to explaining how to interpret the Eleventh Amendment.
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The Court, having chosen this reading, could not accept
it. Justice Scalia expressed the orthodox view of the results
of the acontextual reading when he wrote:
For there is no plausible reason why one would wish to protect a
State from being sued in federal court for violation of federal
law ... when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or country,

but to permit a State to be sued there when the plaintiff is a citizen of the State itself. Thus, [there must [be] some other constitutional principle beyond the immediate text of the Eleventh
Amendment.

In other words, confronted with these implausible results, the Court has felt it necessary to ignore entirely what
is undoubtedly clear in the language, its specific list of what
particular arrangement of parties is forbidden.
There is another reading available, however, which Justice Scalia recognized when he wrote:
If this text were intended as a comprehensive description of state
sovereign immunity in federal courts-that is, if there were no
state sovereign immunity beyond its precise terms-then it would
unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing
immunity onlyj2 when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction that it
describes ....

This other reading is the contextual reading. If that
reading were chosen, the result would be greater congruence with the Constitutional scheme and results that seem
neither absurd nor inequitable. Moreover, the Court would
not have begun to chase down the unwritten principles behind the text which has led to the Court's current romance
with state sovereignty, power and "rights."
2. The contextual reading. The Eleventh Amendment's
language refers back to Article III, which establishes the
federal judiciary and its jurisdiction. That article explains
that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity... in several select instances." Thus, the first
21. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Al-

though Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, his view not only was the orthodox one
but the result he sought has not come about; as described below, the Court
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida.See id.
22. Id.
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several words of the Eleventh Amendment, "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity..." are a direct and nearly

verbatim reference to the beginning of Article III. Moreover,
the language, "shall not be construed to extend," bespeaks a
desire to avoid wholesale disruption of the Constitutional
scheme, a cautious respect for the existing text that appears
wholly lacking in current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
Since the first words of the article and the amendment
mirror each other, it might prove fruitful to compare the
rest of the language in both to see if the latter continues to
mirror the former. Therefore, a closer look at the article is
in order. There are ten separate phrases in that section,
each setting forth a different basis for the exercise of the
federal judicial power. The relevant part of Article III reads
as follows, with the addition of some numbering to set the
phrases apart:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,

[11 arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-[2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;-[3] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-[4] to Controversies to which the United Sates shall be a
Party;-[5] to Controversies between two or more States;-[6 between a State and Citizens of another State;-[7 between Citizens
of different States;-[8 between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [9] and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, [101 [or foreign]
23
Citizens or Subjects.

Of the items in this list, two-[1] "arising under" and

[3] "all cases of admiralty"--are based on the source of law.
At least for the first, what we usually call "federal question"
jurisdiction, the drafters surely anticipated that states
might be parties, but they were neither specifically included
nor excluded. That most plausibly can be explained as because it is irrelevant who the parties are in such cases.
Federal question jurisdiction is not based on who the parties are, but something more important, the guarantee of
the rule of law.
The remainder of the list is too easily glossed over with
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (bracketed material provided by author).
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the phrase "diversity of citizenship." In that list of bases for
jurisdiction based not on the source of law but the litigants'
identities, three explicitly arise because a state is a party,
and one other normally would be found to include suits in
which states were parties, that being [4], suits in which the
United States is a party. There has never been a doubt that
the States could be sued on this basis.
A structural comparison of the Eleventh Amendment's
language with the rest of the Constitution shows that of the
five situations in which federal power had been granted to
decide cases involving states, only two were made subject to
the Eleventh Amendment's interpretive rule which allows
states to be parties, but not if they are the defendant. Article III reads as follows, deleting all but the two relevant
bases of jurisdiction, the sixth and ninth in the list above:
(a) "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity..." (b) "between a State and Citizens of another State.. ." (c) "and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."24
The Eleventh Amendment adds a vociferous BUT to
that grant of power, saying, "[Yes, but] (a) [t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity," [thus mirroring the initial
clause of Article III] (b) "commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another
State,"[clarifying that the judicial power for suits between
states and citizens of other states was not meant to include
suits where the states were defendants, but rather only
those cases the state brings] (c) "or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." [clarifying that the judicial power established in the ninth item listed in Article III, section 2,
also applies only to suits the states initiate] .5
Remember, an "amendment" is a change. As the previous ten amendments were really additions to the text in the
form of the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh Amendment was the
first amendment to be an actual change to the Constitution's previously drafted provisions. It also was the first to
adopt the convention of retaining the original text but adding to it contradictory instructions. This drafting convention
should not require us to ignore that the Eleventh Amendment was a change to Article III and can be read back into
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, combined with art. III, § 2, cl.1.
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that text. Had the Eleventh Amendment been incorporated
directly into the text of Article III to amend it, rather than
being placed at back of the text of the Constitution, Article
III would have read as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,

[11 arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-[2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;-[3] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-[4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-[5] to Controversies between two or more States;-[6] between a State and Citizens of another State; but it shall not be
construed to extend to any suit commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State,-[7] between
Citizens of different States;-[8 between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [91 and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, [10 or
foreign] Citizens or Subjects, but it shall not be construed to extend
to any suit commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
26
States by Citizens or Subjects of any ForeignState.

Therefore, the amendment read in context only amends
two of the ten bases of jurisdiction in Article III. If a suit
against a state were brought solely on the basis that the
plaintiff was a citizen of another state, the federal courts
will not hear it. On the other hand, if there is some other
basis for the suit, as for example that it arises under a federal law, the federal courts could entertain the suit. That
suit would not be dependent on the identity of the parties,
so an amendment limiting jurisdiction over cases based on
the identity of the parties would not apply.
This reading certainly comports with the history of the
Eleventh Amendment that cannot be disputed, which is
that it was adopted to overrule Chisolm v. Georgia.27 That
case was an action by a citizen of another state against
Georgia to get the state to pay its debts on war bonds. The
action sounded in assumpsit and was based solely on state
common law questions of contract and debt. There was no
"federal question," except the pressing question of whether
the federal government would force its financially weak26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (bracketed numbering of the bases of jurisdiction and, in italics, the language of the Eleventh Amendment (and the additional word "but") supplied by author).
27. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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ened constituent states to pay their debts more quickly than
the state governments themselves determined they could
pay. The paradigm case the Eleventh Amendment intended
to "correct" raised the specter of federal execution on state
property over garden-variety actions founded on the state's
own laws. No state in those financially troubled times in
our early history allowed such suits against themselves in
their own courts.
The history and the text, as well as the results it would
engender, therefore render the contextual reading "unquestionably... most reasonable."28 Yet the Court (including the
justice who acknowledged the contextual reading as most
reasonable) has rejected this reading. As the Court cannot
abide the results of the acontextual reading either, it ought
not to be a surprise that the Court has chosen a third alternative-the romantic reading.
3. The romantic reading. The Court, as we shall see,
made a choice over a century ago to read the Eleventh
the
Court
Although
acontextually.2
Amendment
occasionally recognizes the contextual reading, and in fact
at times appears to accept it,3 ° all of its decisions in the last
century in fact proceed from the choice of the acontextual
reading. Having freely chosen that reading, the Court has
found that reading's implications to be absurd, and
therefore the Court has rejected explicitly the text of the
amendment as a guide to the amendment's meaning.3 ' In a
sense, then, rather than choose either the contextual or
acontextual reading the Court has chosen not to read the
amendment at all. The Court does not simply reject the text
and ignore the Eleventh Amendment, however, as it has
with other parts of the Constitution.32 Rather, it struggles to

28. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
29. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
30. See infra notes 179-215 and accompanying text (discussing College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd (Patent Act), 527
U.S. 627 (1999)).
31. See supranotes 11 & 20.
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (republican form of government guarantee); U.S. CONST amend. M- U.S. CONST amend XIV, § 1 (Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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find the spirit that the text "merely exemplifies.""3 That
project suggests that the Court is engaged in what could
usefully be called the "romantic reading" of the Eleventh
Amendment.
To understand why this "reading" could be called "romantic," it will be useful to remind ourselves of "Romanticism" and of the Hegelian systemization that united and
developed many of the Romantic themes (while rejecting
others). Calling the Court's reading "romantic" and suggesting, as this article does, that its reading serves a
"Hegelian" object is not to say that the Court is consistently
Romantic or Hegelian, or even that it is consciously Romantic or Hegelian. Rather, the Court has adopted certain attitudes and methodologies that can be understood as reflecting Romanticism, and specifically has a view of the state (in
the sense of one of the fifty members of one class of government in our multi-layered system of co-ordinate governments) that is very like the Hegelian view of the state (in
the sense of "[t]he state [as] the actuality of the ethical
Idea").34
One of the characteristics of Romanticism was its emphasis on "feeling" rather than the rationalism of the Enlightenment. 5 (Of course, by and large the Constitution was
produced by men whose education was in that very Enlightenment tradition.) Moreover, often "Romanticism" had
a strong attraction to bygone eras which it "romanticized"a process of simplification and idealization that is familiar
to anyone who has ever seen, for example, an old Hollywood
movie about the gunfight at the OK Corral. As exemplified
by the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Romantics
tended to see each historical epoch as reflecting its own in-

33. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68
(1997).
34. GEORG WILHELM FRiERiCH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1942), excerpted in WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, GREAT
POLITIcAL THINKERS 617 (Dryden Press 1969).
35. JOHN BURT HALSTED, ROMAiIcIsM 13 (1969) ("In a central and constantly repeated figure that dominates Romanticism's criticisms of its predecessors, the rationalism of the philosophes was characterized as cold, like the mechanical universe they believed in, as unfeeling, without the warmth the
Romanticists admired.")
36. Id. at 34 (quoting a Romantic historian, Mayerhoff: "The historian, not
unlike the artist, must recreate a character, the sense of a meeting, the atmosphere on the eve of a battle, the spirit of [the period studied]").
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trinsic truths, and each nation its own "soul.""7 The "soul" of
an era and a nation cannot be understood solely by the intellect. It requires an act of feeling and creative imagination.8
One strain of Romanticism especially emphasized the
nation's soul, seeing the "people" of a "nation" as an organic
unity. 9 Georg Wilhelm Friedreich Hegel, who was a professor of philosophy at Heidelberg and Berlin during the glory
days of Romanticism,4" fully accepted the notion that "the
state is an organism .... )A1 Of course, Hegel's immense influence on Euro-American philosophy cannot be reduced to
merely identifying him as a Romantic. Indeed, in very many
ways he rejected Romanticism, while in others he brought it
to systematic fruition. While the entire breadth of his work
need be neither discussed nor criticized, two aspects do
need to be mentioned. First, he was an "historicist," with
history reflecting a progressive dialectic. 42 Thus, a Hegelian
could speak of the "spirit of the age." Second, Hegel also
emphasized the organic unity of the people, but only
through the unity of the state.43 It is this aspect that is most
important to understanding the Court's Eleventh Amendment project.
For Hegel (though not necessarily for many others iden-

37. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Vico AND HERDER: Two STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS 181-82 (1976) (noting that Herder often used terms such as "National-

geist," "Geist des Volkes," "Seele des Volkes," "Geist der Nation," and "Geiss des
Volkes").
38. See HALSTED, supra note 35, at 13 ("The heart was held to be the source
of knowledge, the location of innate ideas. Intuition was equated with that
which men feel strongly .... One power [existed that] was distinct and superior
to reason, namely imagination.").
39. See id. at 25 ("[The [Romantic view] of the state and of the nation is organic. The state is to be understood genetically as a product of the combined
wisdom of earlier generations .... ).
40. See EDWARD CAIRD, HEGEL 77 (1968).
41. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, excerpted in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS,
supra note 34, at 616.
42. See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY 19 (J. Sibree trans., 1956) ("The History of the world is none other than
the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.. . ."); id. at 23 ("We have spoken
of the Idea of Freedom as the nature of Spirit, and the absolute goal of History.").
43. See, e.g., id. at 39 ("In the history of the World, only those peoples can
come under our notice which form a state. For it must be understood that... all
the worth which the human being possesses-all spiritual reality, he possesses
only through the State.... The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth.").
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tified as part of the larger Romantic movement), this "organic unity" had a greater reality than the individual.
Hegel emphasized that the state is more than any individual citizen. In fact, it is more than the sum of its individual
citizens, because a person is born into and created by the
social and historical background of the state. For Hegel,
"Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its
members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life."44 As he further put it:
The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of
the substantial will which it possesses in the particular selfconsciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substantial unity is an absolute
unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme
right. On the other hand this final end has supreme right against
the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state.45

What, then, does all this have to do with the Eleventh
Amendment? As noted above, the Court's current reading of
the Eleventh Amendment begins with its observation that:
To respect the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying, we have extended a State's protection
from suit to suits brought by the State's own citizens. Furthermore, the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in 4Jeopardy whether or not
the suit is based on diversity jurisdiction.

Yet this principle of which the text of the Eleventh
Amendment offers only one, presumably insufficient, example is never itself articulated in any of the Court's opinions.
That is, the exact criteria for application of the principle of
which the Court speaks are never laid out. This article postulates that is because it is not an intellectual principle but
the Court's impression of the "spirit of the age" in which the
Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment were written.
Therefore, one key aspect of the romantic reading is that it
relies not on carefully articulated principles but rather on
an emotional and imaginative response to the text. The
44.
45.
46.
phasis

EBENSTEIN, supranote 34, at 618.
Id. (emphasis added).
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997) (emadded).
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words of the text act only as a catalyst enabling our current
imaginations to reach into the imagination of another, bygone era. The Court is romantic in its emphasis on a
greater knowledge arising from this creative imagination
than from the mere intellect alone.
Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on that bygone era,
the time of the "founders," reflects the historicism of the
Romantics. As described more fully below, the Court's historicism is not accompanied by rigorous historical research
and analysis. Rather, it is the historicism that romanticizes
the past. The history the Court explores is not the complex
interaction of social, political, geographical and economic
factors that real historians study. Rather, it is the Romantic
47
construct the Court calls the "founders' understanding."
The "founders' understanding" is not something any
amount of data on the thoughts and beliefs of any number
of particular persons could discover. The Court never
wastes time identifying who counts as a founder because no
one really has to be a founder-that title reflects the Court's
version of the "nation's soul."
To sum up the romantic reading thus far, we see that
the text of the Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant except as
a catalyst to sympathetic imagination, enabling the Court
to enter into the "founders' understanding." That "founders'
understanding" is the soul of the nation of a different epoch
(an epoch whose ethos the Court claims binds us, and
which, one suspects, the Court finds superior to the ethos of
our time). What, though, is the object of this "understanding"? Here, the Court's romantic reading serves its Hegelian
purpose. The object of the "founders' understanding" is the
"State" (the Court always capitalizes the word). The state
has "rights" 4 in this understanding that are on a par with
those of any other person, or in fact superior to those of any
other person. The state is the original repository of all sovereignty and the source of any sovereignty that now resides
in the federal government. The Court resolves conflicting
notions of popular sovereignty through a romantic conception of the State as the paradigm of political accountabil-

47. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
48. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666 (1999); see also infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
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ity.4 9 Certain portions of recent Court opinions read as if
there were some near-mystical connection between state
government and the true "will of the people." The romantic
reading of the Eleventh Amendment ignores the text in order to serve the broader and grander "founders' understanding" of a State as a sovereign person, the full expres-

sion of which might indeed, reflecting Hegel's thought, be
the true and full expression of freedom."
One warning, though. Hegel was not a democrat.5 ' Neither is the Court's romantic reading of the Eleventh
Amendment one that promotes the values of democracy.
B. The ParallelEleventh Amendment: Leaving the Text
Behind
As described above,52 Chisolm v. Georgia arose out of a
garden-variety breach of contract case, grounded in state
law of assumpsit. It only came to the federal courts through
diversity of citizenship. After the Eleventh Amendment, it
was and remains indisputable that the only kind of cases
that can be brought under the quoted basis for federal jurisdiction are cases brought by the state against citizens of
other states. Until well after the Civil War, the federal
courts had no reason to further expand the meaning and
doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment." After the Civil War
49. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
50. EBENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 616 ("The state is the actuality of concrete
freedom.").
51. See id. at 620 ("[T]he sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the 'people.' Taken without its monarch and the
articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of
monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state." (emphasis
added)).
52. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
53. That is, except for Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831),
which held that federal courts could not hear disputes between the Cherokee
Nation and the state of Georgia. Undoubtedly this decision could be seen as an
expansion of the scope of state immunity, but it seems to have entered history
more as an example of the peculiar disabilities of the First Nations because of
their status as "domestic dependent nations." In fact, in that case the Cherokee
Nation was seeking an injunction against not only the state but named officers
to keep them from enforcing state law inside the Nation's boundaries. That suit,
were it brought today, ought to fall under the aegis of the doctrine of Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and be cognizable in federal court. On the other
hand, the Court's recent decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997), shows that the Ex parte Young doctrine often seems to
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and the Civil War Amendments54 led to a vast expansion of
federal power, a couple of seminal decisions expanded the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment as well, perhaps as part
of a conservative backlash against the new, post-war kind of
federalism.55 After a brief period of expansion, however, the
Court spent most of the twentieth century crafting exceptions to state sovereign immunity, in order to keep the expanded Eleventh Amendment in check. In the last decade of
the twentieth century, however, the Court has returned to
expanding the role of state immunity. In so doing, it has
overturned most of its own careful work over the last several decades to ensure the rule of law is not frustrated by
an unwarranted reading of the Eleventh Amendment.
1. The first wave of expansion: the debtor state cases.

The Eleventh Amendment began to expand in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. It is probably significant
that the line of cases from Chisolm," the decision which
prompted the Eleventh Amendment, to Hans,57 the first
expansion of that amendment's immunity, to Principalityof
Monaco v. Mississippi," the last great expansion of that
immunity before the contemporary period, all concerned
states reneging on a debt. In each decision, the Court
avoided what it probably felt was an inappropriate and
unseemly use federal judicial power directly against state
treasuries. A federal money judgment implies federal
execution. Federal execution raises the specter of something
like a United States Marshal's sale of state property at
public auction, or attachment of state bank accounts. The
Court might have done well to address that problem
directly, rather than so twist the Eleventh Amendment as
to make it devoid of useful form.
The Court managed nearly a century under the Eleventh Amendment before confronting the language of that
amendment in a significant way. In the latter part of the
be useless to tribes in intergovernmental disputes with states. See infra notes
153-85 and accompanying text.
54. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV.
55. See discussion of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) and Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1931), infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
56. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see infra note 71.
57. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
58. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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nineteenth century, however, federal power expanded in a
number of ways. Not only were the critical Civil War
Amendments passed, along with very far-reaching statutes
to enforce those amendments, 9 but so were federal statutes
significantly changing the nature of adjudicating federal
claims. It was not until 1875 that the lower federal courts
were authorized to hear federal question suits." From the
adoption of the Constitution until 1875 such suits were left
to state courts with appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. In deciding what to do with federal question suits
raised against a state by its own citizens, the Court began
to craft an entirely new, "parallel" Eleventh Amendment. In
creating the parallel amendment, the Court began to view
the text of the Eleventh Amendment not as a specific set of
exceptions to the specific list of granted judicial power
found in Article III, but as a mere example of a broader,
unwritten, but binding, principle of state immunity.
The expansion began in Hans v. State of Louisiana.6 In
Hans, the plaintiff held bonds which the Reconstruction
government of Louisiana issued in order to finance public
improvements and stimulate industrial development. The
post-Reconstruction government of Louisiana was less
friendly to public improvements and industrial development
and strongly averse to taxation to pay the bonds. Therefore,
it repudiated its bond obligations and did not pay its debts.
The state did so by adoption of a new constitution in 1879,
which specifically repudiated the bonds.62 Hans sued the
state in federal court, claiming that the state's issuance of
bonds was a contract with him, and its repudiation of that
debt was an impairment of contract. He therefore claimed a
violation of the Contracts Clause.63
Hans expanded the Eleventh Amendment in two ways,
the first necessarily entailing the other. It held that, despite
the specific language of the amendment prohibiting only a
suit against a state by a citizen of another state or nation, it
also prohibits suits against a state by its own citizens. Of
course, that latter position would have been very easy to
write into the text of the amendment if it is what the
59. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999).
60. See 18 Stat. 470.
61. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
62. See id. at 2-3.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall... pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts").
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amendment's authors wanted. Rather than what it now
says, the amendment could have said, "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of the United States or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."6
Despite the obvious variance from the text, however,
the Court felt obliged to rule as it did because it accepted
the acontextual reading. That is, the Court believed the
Eleventh Amendment applies to suits arising under the
"federal question" jurisdiction of the courts rather than
simply amending the language of the grants of diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction found in Article III. The Court's reluctance to hold a state liable for its political decisions to
renege on its debts, and reluctance to threaten a state with
execution by federal marshals, was understandable and
perhaps even necessary. The problem, however, was one it
brought on itself. It is far from clear that the Contract
Clause was ever intended to apply to governmental debts,
and what is more important, the Court never needed to
have so held in the first place. 65 Rather than ignore the
plain text of the amendment to bar the suit, perhaps the
Court could have limited the scope of the Contracts Clause.
Alternatively, the Court could have noted that Hans' complaint itself was a simple claim for payment of a debt, an
assumpsit claim, and the nature of the debt was determined
by Louisiana's law of contracts. Only Louisiana's anticipated defense, that it had repudiated the contract by state
constitution, raised the federal question as part of the response to that defense. Federal questions are normally held
to be properly pleaded only when they are part of the plaintiffs claim in chief; a case does not become subject to federal
jurisdiction if the federal question arises from a defense.66
As the Court recognized seventy-four years later, it was a

64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (italicized language in language in text replacing
the language "Citizens of another State," which is found in the original).
65. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION 124-36 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989)
(stating that a federal question arises only when it "necessarily appears in the
plaintiffs statement of his own claim ...unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose") (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)).
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"commonplace suit[] in which the federal question did not
itself give rise to the alleged cause of action against the
State but merely lurked in the background."67
After Hans, but for one exception, the next century of
Eleventh Amendment decisions concerned not the further
expansion of the amendment but instead the crafting of exceptions and fictions intended to render states liable to the
rule of law, despite the expanded meaning given to the
amendment. That exception was Principalityof Monaco v.
Mississippi.6 In 1933, certain persons gave the Principality
of Monaco century-old bonds that the State of Mississippi
had issued decades before the Civil War, and on which the
State defaulted in the 1860s." The purpose of the gift was
to put the bonds in the hands of some entity that might be
allowed to sue the State, since the Eleventh Amendment
barred the donors. The Principality then asked leave to
bring suit in the United States Supreme Court under that
Court's original jurisdiction. Like Hans, such a suit was
not barred by the explicit terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Also like Hans, that case involved a debt which a
state had made the political decision to repudiate. Unlike
Hans, however, the basis of jurisdiction was diversity of
citizenship, the one area the contextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment suggests is appropriate for state immunity. Therefore, Principalityof Monaco is arguably more defensible in its overlooking of the text in order to effectuate
the supposed underlying principles behind that text.
Interestingly, the expansion of Principality of Monaco
was not against an entirely clean slate. One hundred years
earlier, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," the Court appeared
to assume that a foreign state could sue a state in federal
court. Cherokee Nation concerned whether the Cherokee
Nation could sue the state of Georgia for the latter's vigorous attempts to destroy the former's government and force
its people out of their homes. Chief Justice Marshall held
that Article III did not allow the suit:
67. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 187
n.3 (1964), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468 (1987).
68. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
69. See id. at 317-18. The great turmoil and dislocation resulting from the
Civil War is an obvious possible explanation for the default.
70. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
71. 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion, that an Indian
tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state, in
the sense of the constitution,
7 and cannot maintain an action in the
courts of the United States.

That is, the Cherokee Nation could not sue a state in
federal court, unlike a foreign nation, which presumably
could do so. The Court in Principality of Monaco rejected
the assumption Chief Justice Marshall made in Cherokee
Nation. Rather than looking to what the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution meant, "The question is whether
the plan of the Constitution involves the surrender of immunity when the suit is brought against a State, without
her consent, by a foreign State."73
Such suits were not barred by the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment, and Article III certainly mentions suits between states and foreign nations. Despite the text of the
Constitution, however, the Court ruled against the Principality of Monaco and explained that:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the
words of section 2 of article 3, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against
nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be
found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the postulate
that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty,
shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been "a surrender of this7 4 immunity in the plan of the
convention." The Federalist, No. 81.

That is, the plan of the Constitution at the time of its
adoption and ratification by those States who were surrendering their immunity. While that plan did presuppose surrender of immunity to the extent that States could sue each
other (one of rare kinds of cases over which the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction),75 the Principalityof Monaco
72. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
73. Principalityof Monaco, 292 U.S. at 323.
74. Id. at 322 (internal footnote omitted).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that "[i]n all Cases ... in
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction").
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Court held that the states have not surrendered their sovereign immunity against foreign states which are no part of
the "constitutional plan." Therefore, a state is not subject
"to suits prosecuted against one of the United States by a
foreign state."76 After that decision, the "parallel" amendment read, "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of the United States, by any Foreign State, or by
the Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 7
In fact, an even simpler version of the "parallel"
amendment might be, "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States except for suits brought by another State or the
United States."
The simplicity of phrasing in both alternatives illustrates something significant. If the drafters of the Eleventh
Amendment had wanted to achieve the results the Court's
version has achieved, they easily could have written the
amendment that way. Drafting that sort of amendment
would have required neither detailed, complex phrasing nor
a great deal of imagination. The drafters did not choose to
write these readily imaginable, simply worded alternatives
that would have effectuated the sort of broad principle the
Court now chooses to follow. We should respect the drafter's
decision not to choose those simple, broad alternatives; the
restraint in the language they actually chose must be given
due respect.
All the cases that expanded the Eleventh Amendment
(except Cherokee Nation, which might be viewed as not
really about the Eleventh Amendment at all, but just another odd example of the United States discomfiture with
the existence of aboriginal cultures that refused to disappear) concerned using federal courts to enforce debts
against states. Each case sought, in effect, to tap into state
treasuries to pay off contractual obligations, even though it
is quite likely that those that held government bonds in the
76. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 52.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The italicized language includes all the new
language replacing the actual language of the textual amendment, The italicized language sets forth the new additions after the Principalityof Monaco decision.
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era these bonds were issued were fully cognizant that
shifting politics could lead to debt repudiation. As we shall
soon see, the second wave of expansion that began in the
last decade of the twentieth century went well beyond this
core concern. This concern that it is bad to subject states to
suit for their debts is, by the way, no longer significant.
State debt obligations are normally enforceable against the
states in their own courts, because states have waived immunity in light of the fact that financially prudent investors
would never invest in lending money to states with no assurance of being repaid. On the other hand, the new expansion of the Eleventh Amendment is less concerned with the
politically sensitive nature of debt repudiation and more
concerned with some romantic view of states' rights, with a
concomitantly cavalier view toward the rights of people.
2. Softening the blow: the rise of the ameliorative
doctrines. The first wave of expansion in the Eleventh
Amendment ended with Principalityof Monaco. At least for
most of the twentieth century, the Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions were not concerned with protecting
states, but protecting private persons from the states, and
giving those persons the right to seek redress against
abusive state power. Therefore, the Court developed a set of
ameliorative doctrines to provide some room for people to
sue states for violations of federal law.
In response to the massive growth in the Eleventh
Amendment's scope, especially in its expansion into federal
question jurisdiction, certain ameliorative doctrines had to
be developed to preserve the federal judicial power. The
first is the doctrine that while states may not be sued, state
officials may be, even for official acts, if the relief sought is
prospective-injunctive rather than for damages. The second doctrine, or rather the second set of doctrines, are constructive waiver and abrogation, both of which depend on
the notion that a state that enters a field in which Congress
has power to regulate, does so at the risk of being regulated
and made subject to private persons' suits.
a. Ex parte Young. The Court created the oldest and
most well-established limitation on the Court's potentially
boundless doctrine of state sovereign immunity in Ex parte
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Young." One way to describe the doctrine might be that it
allows federal courts, despite the Eleventh Amendment, to
issue injunctions against state officers in their official
capacities-or at least sometimes federal courts may do so.
The courts may do so by way of a fiction that holds that a
state officer, when violating federal law (constitutional or
statutory) must be acting ultra vires, and thus the
injunction is not really against the state. 9 The Court has
recognized that this is a fiction." After all, even when a
state official as the nominal defendant can operate directly
against the state itself,8' injunctive relief can severely
burden a state as well. 2 Yet without this fiction the
Eleventh Amendment might have swallowed the
Supremacy Clause nearly whole. It would not have been
needed, of course, but for the development of the "parallel"
Eleventh Amendment, arising from the acontextual reading
of the Eleventh Amendment.
The decision was lengthy and convoluted, but its result
was the beginning of the "authority-stripping fiction"" of
the Ex parte Young doctrine. As later clarified in Edelman
84 the doctrine only applies to prospective relief,
v. Jordan,
not retroactive relief-for although the action is putatively
against a "rogue" state officer acting out of bounds of
authority he might have from the state, the Court realized a
money judgment would in fact be against the state treasury.
b. The constructive waiver and abrogation doctrines.
While Ex parte Young is the oldest of the ameliorative
doctrines under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court more
recently developed two other, less fictive limitations on the
amendment's scope: the constructive waiver and the
abrogation doctrines. Under those doctrines, Congress is
78. 209 U.S. 123 (1908), overruling recognized by Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp.v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
79. See generally id.
80. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114
n.25 (1984) (stating that "we have noted that the authority-stripping theory of
Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed").
81. See id. at 101 (citing Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per cu-

riam).
82. See id. at 101-02.
83. See id. at 114 n.25.
84. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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sometimes able to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity
when Congress is doing so in service of a constitutional
grant of authority. Read broadly enough, these doctrines
could have caused the acontextual reading of the Eleventh
Amendment to pass away quietly. Now, however, their
moment has passed.
Both doctrines arise out of the inevitable clash between
ever-increasing direct federal involvement in the lives of individuals and states being increasingly ambitious in the
scope of their actions. The decision critical to both doctrines
was Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks
85 In that case, the Court allowed injured railDepartment.
road employees to sue their employer, a state-owned railroad, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. The Court first reasoned that Congress
had the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to
enact FELA.8" Second, it reasoned that Congress had made
it clear anyone who entered operation of a railroad would be
subject to FELA" Next, it held that the states had surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to the extent needed to
effectuate the Interstate Commerce Clause.88 Finally, the
Court held that "Alabama, when it began operation of an
interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment
of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was
authorized by that Act." 9
This decision has been characterized as the foundation
of the doctrine of "constructive" waiver, and in fact is singled out for criticism in the recent Supreme Court decisions
handed down on June 23, 1999."0 Given the fact that the
current Court disparages the waiver in Parden as "constructive" and contrasts it to a "voluntary" waiver, one must
note that in Parden the Court never used the term "constructive waiver" or any similar terms. To the contrary, the
Court's opinion is that the state had to know that it was
getting into competition with private, federally-regulated
railroads and that it knowingly left "the sphere that is exclusively its own and enter[ed] into activities subject to con85. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
86. See id. at 190-91.
87. See id. at 191.
88. See id. at 192.
89. Id.
90. See infra notes 218-92 and accompanying text.
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gressional regulation."9

The decisions after Parden in which the Court discussed states' waiver of immunity illustrates the Court's
consistent reading of Parden as describing a knowing, voluntary choice to engage in activity that could easily have
been foregone, and in so doing being required to accept the
consequences. Until this last term, the Court consistently
interpreted its ruling in Parden to require proof that the
state consented to suit. Thus, the statute Congress enacts
must make clear an intent to hold states liable for their actions in a certain field.92 Only if the state is on notice that a
choice to enter a federally regulated field will subject the
state to suit will its subsequent decision to enter that field
be interpreted as consent.93
The abrogation doctrine is similar to, but much more
expansive than, the waiver doctrine begun in Parden.Abrogation began, and if it still exists is now limited to, Congressional action under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.94 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer95 the Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by then Associate Justice Rehnquist,
held that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of
state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited
by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."96 Therefore, the 1972 amendments to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 properly authorized federal courts to award money damages against a state government found to have subjected an individual to employ-

91. Parden,377 U.S. at 196.
92. See, e.g., Employees of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards
Act section providing for suits against employers was not amended at the same
time as the FLSA section adding states to those who must comply with statute);
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding
that Congress did not clearly express in the Jones Act an intent to allow suits
against states).
93. In the Lanham Act version of College Savings Bank v.Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), Justice Scalia
suggested this approach shows a Lochner-style judicial meddling in choice of
economic theory. He was wrong, of course. Requiring a state that enters a field
of federally regulated economic activity to play by the rules is not an attack on
that state's right to choose that activity.
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to enact
legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
95. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
96. Id. at 456 (internal citation omitted).
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ment discrimination." Despite the possible implications of
Fitzpatrick, its holding has in fact not opened a great
breach in the dam of state sovereign immunity. For instance, the Court has read the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which provides for actions against "persons acting under
color of state law," not to apply to actions against states
themselves." As a result, even that key civil rights statute
has not abrogated state immunity.
A few years later, however, in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas,99 the Court expanded the abrogation doctrine into the
areas suggested by the Court's statement in Parden that,
"[w]hile a State's immunity from suit by a citizen without
its consent has been said to be rooted in 'the inherent nature of sovereignty,' the States surrendered a portion of
their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce.""0
The Court ruled that abrogation applied not just when
Congress was using its granted power to enforce provisions
of the Constitution that came after the Eleventh Amendment but also those which existed at the time the Eleventh
Amendment was written and ratified. Union Gas represents the high mark, perhaps, of the Court's attempts to
rein in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Union Gas arose under CERCLA (Superfund)."' Union
Gas's predecessors operated a coal gasification plant along a
creek in Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a byproduct. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania acquired
easements in the property along the creek in order to excavate to control flooding. While excavating, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar, which began to
seep into the creek. The Environmental Protection Agency
found the tar to be a hazardous substance, declared the
creek a Superfund site, and together the federal and state
governments cleaned up the site. The federal government
reimbursed the state for its costs, and then sought recoup97. See id.
98. See generally Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
99. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
100. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191
(1964), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468 (1987) (internal citation omitted).
101. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1999).
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ment from Union Gas. °2 Union Gas then brought the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania back into the suit claiming that
Pennsylvania was an "owner and operator" under
CERCLA.'0 The Court's essential holding was that Congress intended to make states liable in money damages under CERCLA,0 4 thus abrogating the states' sovereign immunity, and that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to do so.' °5 As Justice Brennan explained,
"it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress
the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished
their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable." 6
At first glance, the abrogation doctrine might seem to
have the effect of overruling Hans v. Louisiana. Indeed, in
his dissent in Union Gas, Justice Scalia complained that af07
ter the majority's opinion, Hans "means nothing at all."
However, that is not quite the case. Abrogation requires not
just a federal question in a dispute against a state, but also
congressional authorization of such a suit. Congress's
authorization of such a suit, moreover, must be an "unequivocal[]
express[ion of] its intent to abrogate the immu10 8
nity.'

Abrogation threatened to swallow up only the parallel
Eleventh Amendment, those portions of the interpreted
amendment that went beyond a faithful contextual interpretation of the words. Although the ruling in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas only made Eleventh Amendment doctrine
more complicated, it may have been seen at the time as a
precursor to something much more monumental-the eventual abandonment of the acontextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment and the attendant emphasis on the implied general principle of sovereign immunity that gave rise
to the parallel Eleventh Amendment. One might have expected the complicated fictions to chip away at the over102. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989), overruled by
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
103. See id. at 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) in a reference to potentially liable parties).
104. See id. at 13.
105. See id. at 20.
106. Id. at 19-20.
107. Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1995) (quoting Green
v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
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broad prohibitions from cases like Hans and Principalityof
Monaco, until the entire edifice collapsed. In fact, just ten
years ago, one commentator said that "four of [the Court's]
members, and possibly a fifth, may now be prepared to consider wholesale changes to the immunity doctrine that has
survived, more or less intact, for the last hundred years."' °
As it turns out, Union Gas was the high-water mark for
the Court's attempts to impose the rule of law on the states.
The next few years brought a second wave of expansion for
the Eleventh Amendment. That wave began with cases concerning the First Nations (just like the only significant
Eleventh Amendment decision before the Civil War, Cherokee Nation, concerned the First Nations). That expansion
has now gone much further than just "Indian law," however. It has led to the Court's recent exposition of the romantic reading of the Eleventh Amendment, all in service
of a distinctly Hegelian conception of the state.
3. The second wave of expansion: the First Nations
cases. While the three decisions announced June 23, 1999,
confirm and seem to make nearly complete an expansion of
the Eleventh Amendment, that is so broad that it leaves no
room for the text of that amendment. This second wave of
expansion began, however, with a trilogy of cases
concerning intergovernmental disputes between federal
recognized "Indian tribes" (hereinafter referred to as the
First Nations)"0 and the states."' As these cases all
concerned the First Nations, one possibility is that the
Court's Eleventh Amendment discussion in those decisions
should be read in the light of the Court's peculiar,
convoluted and often contradictory "Indian law" decisions.
It is now clear, however, that the import of the first three
decisions goes well beyond just "Indian law."
a. Blatchford or Cherokee Nation: When it hurts either
way. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,"' a 1991
109. Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment,
88 CoLUm. L. REV. 212, 212 (1988) (internal footnote omitted).
110. See John Randolph Prince, Indian Country: A Different Model of Sovereignty, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 103, 104 n.4 (1998).
111. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 44; Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775 (1991).
112. 501 U.S. at 775.

442

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Justice Scalia decision, the Court held that tribes could not
bring an action against the states, not because they differed
from foreign states, as Cherokee Nation had suggested, but
because they are too much like foreign nations. In fact,
Justice Scalia relied on Principality of Monaco as his
primary precedent."' The Blatchford Court based its
analysis not on the Eleventh Amendment's text but on the
Court's own view of the nontextual principles that allegedly
existed in some unspecified "founder's mind" even before
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
In Blatchford, certain Alaska Native villages filed suit
against the State of Alaska's Commissioner of Community
and Regional Affairs challenging the implementation of
State revenue-sharing statute.4 Justice Scalia immediately
turned to the Eleventh Amendment and noted that, at least
since the time of Hans v. Louisiana,. the Court has
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system
with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article
III is limited by this sovereignty... ; and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented
to suit, either
expressly or in the "plan of the [Constitutional] con6
vention.""

That is to say, it is not the words the drafters of the
Eleventh Amendment wrote, and the words that the ratifying conventions voted to place into the Constitution, that
matter, but the drafters' intent that controls. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia failed to heed the advice he himself
has quoted with approval in a recent text: "[Tihe gravest
sins are perpetrated in the name of the intent of the legislature." 7
Justice Scalia then explained why the First Nations, although sovereigns themselves, are prohibited from suing
other sovereigns within the federal system, the States, even
113. See id. at 780.

114. See id. at 778.
115. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
116. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779. Note Justice Scalia's explicit rejection of
the text of the Constitution as controlling constitutional interpretation.
117. ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 18 (1998) (quoting
James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation,"43 HARv. L. REV. 886,
892 (1930)).
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though it is clear states can and do sue each other. As he
analyzed affairs:
Although tribes are in some respects more like States-which may
sue each other-than like foreign sovereigns, it is the mutuality of
concession that makes the States' surrender of immunity from
suits by sister States plausible. There is no such mutuality with
tribes, which have been held repeatedly to enjoy immunity against
suits by States.11

Of course, the view that the mutuality of state and
tribal sovereign immunity-that states and tribe, mutually,
cannot sue each other-is a myth. The tribe's immunity exists entirely at the sufferance of Congress. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained in an opinion issued in the same term
as Blatchford, "Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.""9 As will be
seen below, even when Congress tries to limit state immunity, it cannot; even when it tries to do so to allow states
to resolve their disputes in a lawful and orderly
and tribes
120
way.
Blatchford was only the first of a trilogy of cases concerning the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on disputes
between First Nations and states. The other two, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida' and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho2 ' also had the effect of expanding the Eleventh Amendment. They did so, however, not by increasing
the scope of the amendment's coverage but by reducing the
doctrines that created exceptions from and ways to get
around that amendment's grant of immunity. These two decisions, particularly Seminole Tribe, at the least seriously
damaged and possibly destroyed the ameliorative doctrines
which the Court had been developing over the course of the
last century. These doctrines helped soften the blow from
the expansion of the parallel amendment the Court also has
been developing over the last century.
Even after Blatchford expanded the Eleventh Amend-

118. Blatchford, 501 U.S at 775 (citing Syllabus) (citations omitted).
119. Citizen Band of Pottawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax

Comm'n, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (emphasis added).

120. See discussion of Seminole Tribe, infra notes 130-52 and accompanying

text.
121. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
122. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
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ment to include state immunity from suit by the tribes,
these tribes still had room for optimism about obtaining a
judicial forum for disputes. After all, one of Congress's
enumerated powers is an exclusive power to regulate commerce between tribes and all others, private and governmental." If a dispute between states and tribes arose over
matters falling under the heading of "commerce," and if
Congress had not only regulated that area of commerce but
expressly subjected states to suits by the tribes, tribes had
every reason to believe that state immunity from suit was
taken away. Rather than allow that result, however, the
Court instead repudiated most of the abrogation doctrine.
b. Ending abrogation. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida addressed the power of the sovereign tribe to bring
an action against a state in a situation where Congress
specifically intended to abrogate any Eleventh Amendment
immunity to allow the suit. The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act ("IGRA")24 imposes upon the states a duty to negotiate
in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a
compact regulating gambling in Indian country found
within the boundaries of a state, 2 5 and authorizes a tribe to

bring suit in federal court against a state in order to compel
performance of that duty.'26 This scheme of negotiation was
intended to take the place of a situation where the tribe,
claiming the rights of a sovereign, chooses to allow
gambling the same way as, for example, Nevada and New
Jersey have done.' The tribes, under IGRA, had that right
taken away, largely at the insistence of the states which

surround most tribal land. 28 In return, the tribes had every

reason to believe the states waived claims to sovereign
immunity. Pursuant to IGRA, the Seminole Tribe of Indians
filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida against the state and its
123. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
124. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
125. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).
126. See id. § 2710(d)(7).
127. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (allowing California tribe to hold bingo games in violation of California
law). IGRA was enacted the following year.
128. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) ("Indian tribes have the exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity [only as long as] conducted within a State which does

not... prohibit such gaming activity.").
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officers to compel negotiations after the State of Florida
refused to negotiate.12 The State of Florida raised a defense
of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 3 '
Ultimately, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court agreed with the state that, despite
Congress's express intent in IGRA to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment forbade any
such suit. 3 '
Of course, the requirement that a First Nation consult
another political entity before deciding what economic activities to allow within the Nation's territory is in itself a
major surrender of the tribes' sovereignty. IGRA was a
compromise of both the states' "sovereign immunity" and an
attribute of sovereignty claimed by states themselves and
many tribes, as well as the right to make their own decisions about gambling on their territory. 3 2 Thus, if broader
principles of sovereignty suggest the state cannot be sued,
then those same principles might suggest the tribes can and
should ignore the states surrounding them, and refuse to
negotiate gambling compacts themselves. On the other
hand, if suits between sovereigns depend on mutual concession as suggested in Blatchford, there is plenty of such concession to go around in state-tribal relations."'
IGRA certainly limited tribal sovereign immunity, for if
the tribe violates a gaming contract with Florida, the state
could subject the tribe to civil fines and closure of the tribe's
gaming facilities,' and, in fact, could seek to have the
tribe's patrons and employees criminally prosecuted in federal court.'35 Indeed, Congress not only can strip the tribes
of their immunity but their very sovereignty in all its aspects.' On the other hand, the state's immunity is consti129. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 52 (1996).
130. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
appeal dismissed, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 513 U.S. 1125
(1995), affd, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
131. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
132. See, e.g., DEAN R. SNOW, THE IROQUoIS 201-09 (1994) (discussing progambling factions at the Mohawk reservation at Akwesasne/St. Regis claiming
unrestricted rights to engage in gaming irrespective of the positions of the state
of New York or the federal government).
133. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
134. See 25 U.S.C. § 2713 (1994).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(b) (1994).
136. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It ex-
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tutional; after Seminole Tribe, it is clear that Congress cannot abrogate that immunity except, perhaps, to enforce the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, while the tribe's exists entirely at Congress's sufferance. The result is that, after Seminole Tribe, the state can refuse to do what Congress presumably has the power to order it to do under the
Indian Commerce Clause and immunity from suit to coerce
it to do what it is supposed to do. The effect is that the
state's exercise of sovereignty will prohibit the tribe's own
exercise of its sovereignty-the tribe will not be able to
make its own decisions about gaming.
For the Eleventh Amendment, however, Seminole Tribe
has even broader implications than that the First Nations
are in a disfavored position in our complex coordinate system of affiliated governments. To reach its result, the Court
not only held that the Indian Commerce Clause did not give
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
but the Commerce Clause did not either, explicitly and
bluntly overruling Union Gas."7
If it is the theory of abrogation that in 1789 states surrendered these aspects of sovereignty, it is the theory of the
Court in Seminole Tribe that a few years later the Eleventh
Amendment took it back. Following the lead of Justice
Scalia's dissent in Union Gas, the Court viewed abrogation
as founded on an anachronism, because it creates a "limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." 8 That is why the Fourteenth Amendment remains a
viable source for abrogation, at least in theory; that
amendment "operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment."" 9 As it came after the Eleventh
Amendment, it can limit it.
While the use of chronology to reject abrogation is appealingly simple, it does not work. Only the written text of
the Eleventh Amendment came after the adoption of the
ists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.
But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.").
137. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (explaining
that the Court feels "bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided
and that it should be, and now is, overruled").
138. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 65-66 (citation omitted).
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Constitution. Nothing in the written text of that amendment prohibits a suit by a tribe located within a state
against that state. The only way the tribe was barred from
suit was the Court's use, not of the text, but of "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment."14 ° That "principle" apparently is much broader in scope than the text, because the Court explained that "we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
but for the presupposition.., which it confirms."
That
presupposition goes well beyond the words; it reflects a
"broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution,
which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying." That broader principle supposedly was found in the Constitution at the time it was
written, because it was the background against which the
Constitution was written. Indeed, what really controls are
the suppositions of inherent sovereignty existing at the
time of the Constitution's adoption modified only by the
"plan of the convention" that wrote the Constitution."r' The
Court did not find immunity based on the amendment ratified in 1798, but rather the world-view already in existence
at the time of the Constitution, which the later amendment
only "confirms." But if that principle already existent at the
time the Constitution was adopted, then the Constitution's
terms are not antecedent to the principle of state immunity.
The Court cannot have it both ways. Either the adoption of the text of the amendment in 1798 limits the antecedent text in Article III, in which case one must seriously try
to interpret those two texts together, or the "principles" of
immunity were there all along, and the Constitution's grant
of power to Congress comes after, not before, them in time.
The only limitation the Eleventh Amendment itself can put
on antecedently granted Congressional power is the limitation it states in the text (however one interprets it). To determine what that limitation is, like it or not, the Court
must hold its nose and show some "blind reliance upon the
text of the Eleventh Amendment."'"
140. Id. at 66 (quoting Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
141. Id. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,
779 (1991)) (emphasis added).
142. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997).
143. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1934)).
144. Id. at 69.
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The Seminole Tribe Court not only overruled Union Gas
and dealt a severe blow to abrogation, but it also began a
process of weakening the doctrine of Ex parte Young, a process that continued into its next term and its most recent
attack on the First Nations, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho.145 The Seminole Tribe was not seeking money dam-

ages obtained from the state treasury. Rather, it sought to
compel the state to enter mediation about a compact as required by IGRA. That remedy, although a creature of a
statute, was of course equitable in nature. In order to hedge
its bets, moreover, the Seminole Tribe brought suit against
the governor individually to compel him to act in accordance with federal law-in other words, a suit under Ex
parte Young. The nature of the remedy sought was totally
prospective and totally equitable in nature. Despite the apparently clear claim under Ex parte Young, however, the
Court found the suit against the Governor to be barred as
well. 46
The Court's explanation for why a suit for prospective,
non-monetary relief against a state officer still was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment was that the suit would improperly supplement a statutory remedial scheme with one
created by the judiciary. "[W]here Congress has prescribed
a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a
State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate
before casting aside those limitations and permitting an ac147
tion against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young."
The detailed remedial scheme to which the Court referred
included, after a federal court finds that the state has failed
to negotiate in good faith, an order directing the state and
the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days. If
the parties disregard the court's order and fail to conclude a
compact within the sixty-day period, the only sanction is
that each party then must submit a proposed compact to a
mediator. Finally, if the state fails to accept the compact
selected by the mediator, that mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior, who then must prescribe regulations
governing Class III gaming on the tribal lands at issue.
145. 521 U.S. at 261.
146. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-76.
147. Id. at 74.
148. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994). Where the state has short-circuited
the first two steps of this remedial process, one might speculate what would
happen if the Seminole Tribe applied directly to the Secretary of the Interior to
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All the Seminole Tribe was seeking in the litigation before
the Court was the first step in that process-an order to
conclude a compact in sixty days, directed at the state official who was responsible for the non-compliance with
IGRA's commands. Yet the Court concluded that such an
order-to comply with the statute-would be "additional" to
the statute's own remedies, because the statute is directed
at "the State" and not particular state officers! 49
In sum, the Court denied the tribe the right to bring
suit under the Ex parte Young doctrine because there was
another, statutory, remedy. At the same time, the Court
struck down that very statutory remedy. The principle of
state immunity had swallowed up all common sense.
c. Weakening Ex parte Young. The capstone of
confusion over the Eleventh Amendment and the tribes
came in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.' First, the
Blatchford Court abandoned the text of the Eleventh
Amendment entirely in order to rely on the amendment's
putative "broader principles" and the undiscovered country
of the plan of the convention's implications in order to find
that sovereign tribes and sovereign states cannot sue each
other. Then, in Seminole Tribe, the Court completely
jettisoned its recent innovation, the abrogation doctrine,
intended to ameliorate the remedial gap its own Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence had created. Finally, in Coeur
d'Alene, the Court reduced the ameliorative doctrine with
the longest pedigree, that enunciated in Ex parte Young, to
an unreliably confused mess.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe lives on the Columbia Plateau
in Northern Idaho, a region to which they are indigenous.
In the nineteenth century, they agreed under rather obvious pressure to relinquish their sovereign status over much
of the land they had lived on for centuries and accept a diminished area reserved for them as against the claims of
the United States and its citizens. In 1873, President Grant
issued an Executive Order establishing the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation. 5' The boundaries established by that Execuprescribe gaming regulations.
149. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (citation omitted).
150. 521 U.S. at 261.
151. See id. at 265 (citing Exec. Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 C.
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES

837 (1904)).
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tive Order included "the banks and beds and submerged
lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene and some portions of various
rivers and streams," including the Spokane River, the
Coeur d'Alene River, and the Saint Joe River."2 Seventeen
years later, in 1890, the territory of Idaho was admitted to
statehood, completely surrounding the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The following year, in 1891, Congress formally
ratified the fourteen-year-old agreement with the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe.'53
Although Lake Coeur d'Alene is within those boundaries which were preserved to the tribe out of the larger territory to which it held aboriginal sovereign title, and although that reservation preceded the creation of the state of
Idaho, Idaho has long assumed and exercised sovereignty
over the lake. In fact, in its brief to the Supreme Court in
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho stated that "[t]he Tribe's action
154
threatens the sovereign authority of the state of Idaho,"

assuming the answer to the real underlying question-which sovereign has authority in that territory-the
same way, as we shall see, as the Supreme Court did. In
any case, the state's exercise of authority was not hypothetical. Idaho not only claimed the submerged lands under
the lake,'55 it vested management of the lake in a state

board of land commissioners. 156 That state board in turn

took such actions as leasing part of the bed of the lake to
private operators for a marina, an action challenged in
court as destructive to the environment. In that challenge,
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the state was in fact the
owner of the lake and had the right to act as it did.'57 That
same year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
ruled that in fact the tribe was sovereign over portion of the
lakebed

58

and the United States has taken the position,

both in the recent Supreme Court proceedings and in ongoing litigation it has brought as the tribe's trustee, that in
152. Id.
153. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1442, 1452 n.5
(D. Idaho 1992), rev'd, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
154. Brief for Petitioner at *2, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261 (1997) (No. 94-1474), availablein 1996 WL 290997 (U.S. Pet. Brief).
155. See id.
156. See IDAHO CODE § 58-104(9) (1995).
157. See Kootenai Envt'l Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671
P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
158. 25 FERC 61,228 (1983), reh'g den., 26 FERC 61,026 (1984).
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fact the tribe is sovereign over much of the disputed territory.'59 Unfortunately for the tribe, the United States' claim
is for less territory than the tribe's claim, so the tribe cannot simply allow the former's lawsuit to settle the matter.16 °
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for a highly fractured Court. Only Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed in all particulars with the former's opinion; Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring with the
judgment but disagreeing with a significant part of the reasoning in Justice Kennedy's opinion, and Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined her.' Meanwhile, Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer all joined with Justice Souter in dissent. 6 2 Both the principal and concurring opinions are, in
varying degrees, revolutionary. In summary, the five justices who voted to reverse the Court of Appeals all agreed
that Ex parte Young needed to be limited in some fashion to
prohibit suits that challenge state sovereignty, and "State
ownership of [lands underlying navigable waters] has been
'considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.' ""'In addition, Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice suggested replacing Ex parte Young with a new test, while the three
others have chosen to impose certain ill-defined, "I know it
when I see it" limits on the Young test."M
Justice Kennedy, writing for all five justices who decided against the tribe and for the state, first pointed out
the obvious, "that Young rests on a fictional distinction between the official and the State."'65 Therefore, Kennedy argued (and in this statement four other justices agreed) that
"[a]pplication of the Young exception must reflect a proper
understanding of its role in our federal system and respect
for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious
fiction."'66
If we cannot rely on Young "reflexively," what can we
159. See, e.g., United States Amicus Brief, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (No. 94-1474).
160. See id.
161. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997).
162. Id. at 297.
163. Id. at 283 (quoting Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S.
193, 195 (1987)).
164. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
165. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (quoting the Court's interpretation of
the holding in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
166. Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
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do? Justice Kennedy suggested, if only for himself and the
Chief Justice, something breathtaking-an entirely new
doctrine, unfounded in any hint of text in the Eleventh
Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution, to take the
place of Ex parte Young.
Justice Kennedy interpreted the long and confusing history of Ex parte Young suits to rely on two sets of circumstances. As his view of history has it, "there are, in general,
two instances where Young has been applied. The first is
where there is no state forum available to vindicate federal
interests, thereby placing upon Article III courts the special
obligation to ensure167the supremacy of federal statutory and
constitutional law."
That statement is the opening salvo in a battle to replace Young with the "Coeur d'Alene" doctrine. Under that
test, the tribe here loses for the simple, mechanical reason
that a state forum existed. Justice Kennedy spent considerable effort in the next several pages of the opinion defending his interpretation of a few of the many cases decided in
Young in which the lack of a state forum could be said to
have been a problem, and defending state courts as perfectly acceptable fora for federal, even constitutional
ques16
tions, even when the state itself is a party.
Justice Kennedy's explanation that he would allow an
Ex parte Young injunctive action when there was no adequate state forum is in tension with the rationale in Hans v.
Louisiana, which expanded the Eleventh Amendment in a
way but for which the Ex parte Young fiction would never
have been needed in the first place. Recall that in Hans the
Court reasoned that it must bar claims by a state's own
citizens because otherwise
we should have this anomalous result, that in cases arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued
in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued
for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal
169 courts, although
not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.

The Hans Court seemed to be disturbed by what it
viewed as an anomaly, a federal action where no state ac167. Id.
168. See id. at 270-80.
169. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
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tion was possible. Justice Kennedy, however, considers that
situation to be the best justification for a federal suit. If
nothing else, the fact that what seemed to be an anomaly to
one Court is quite rational and fair to another ought to
make us suspicious of ignoring the text of the Eleventh
Amendment in order to avoid supposedly anomalous or absurd or inequitable results.
After expending some effort to justify this new "lack of
state forum" test, however, Justice Kennedy grudgingly had
to admit that not all Ex parte Young cases could be made to
fit that test. There was another instance where the Ex parte
Young doctrine applied. This instance for applying the
Young doctrine is much broader than the first one, lack of
state forum, and subsumes it. Although clearly he believes
that second test should be abandoned, Justice Kennedy is
not ready to announce its death quite yet, not until he has
laid the groundwork sufficiently. Here is what Justice Kennedy wrote about that "second instance":
[A] second instance in which Young may serve an important interest is when the case calls for the interpretation of federal law
[however] .... It is difficult to say States consented to these types
of suits in the plan of the Convention. Neither in theory nor in
practice has it been shown problematic to have federal claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity
would be applicable in federal court but for an exception based on
Young. For purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply7 irrele0
vant whether the claim is brought in state or federal court.1

And still later: "It would be error coupled with irony
were we to bypass the Eleventh Amendment, which enacts
a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole rationale that
state courts are inadequate to enforce and interpret federal
rights in every case." (In response, one might note the
irony of the Court's choosing to bypass the Eleventh
Amendment in order to enact a scheme excessively solicitous of the States.)
Kennedy's lengthy discussion of the "lack of state forum" justification for an injunctive action against a state officer was necessary to him because, as ought to be clear
from the just quoted language, he does not agree with the
"Supremacy Clause" justification for such suits. He thinks it
170. Coeurd'Alene, 521 U.S. at 274-75.
171. Id. at 276.
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an erroneous reason to allow suits in federal court despite
state sovereign immunity and would like to bring it to an
end. Short of being able to do that, however, he does the
next best thing: subject that instance of Young doctrine to a
balancing test. Despite their protestations to the contrary,
the three concurring justices agreed to just such a balancing
test.
Like it or not, Justice Kennedy could not do away with
all the cases based on the notion that federal law requires
federal courts, but he could make sure that there would also
be "a careful balancing and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young exception applies in a given case."1 2 This balancing must be done on a
case-by-case basis. As the decision of the three justices who
actually agreed with his result characterized this approach,
"the principal opinion replaces a straightforward inquiry
into whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective with a vague balancing test that purports to account for a 'broad' range of unspecified factors."'
Yet all five justices who voted to reverse in fact did that
very thing-they went beyond the straightforward inquiry
of whether prospective relief was claimed because they all
agreed that the fact that something so significant to state
sovereignty as title to submerged lands was involved must
be weighed against the litigant's fulfillment of the normal
requirements of Ex parte Young.
Again writing for a majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[tihe suit seeks, in effect, a determination that
the lands in question are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State. The requested injunctive relief would
bar the State's principal officers from exercising their governmental powers
and authority over the disputed lands
and waters." 74
This challenge to state authority weighed in the balance
against the tribe, determinatively so for Kennedy. There
was an available state forum, and the vindication of federal
law did not outweigh the challenge to state sovereignty.
This challenge to state authority was determinative for
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas as well in their im172. Id. at 278.
173. Id. at 296.
174. Id. at 282.
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plicit balance. Justice O'Connor explained that, "[wihere a
plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all regulatory power
over submerged lands-in effect, to invoke a federal court's
jurisdiction to quiet title to sovereign lands-it simply 17can5
not be said that the suit is not a suit against the State."
In other words, such a suit cannot be "properly characterized" as seeking prospective relief."6 But why not? In effect, the concurring opinion says nothing more than when
the state has a great deal invested in continuing an ongoing
violation of federal law, then a federal court cannot enjoin
that state from doing so. In effect, these three justices engage in their own implicit balancing of federal interests
against the state's claims of sovereignty. In doing so, these
justices suggest that if the prospective relief will have too
great an impact on the state, then an otherwise perfectly
acceptable, traditional Ex parte Young suit will be barred.
After the three "Indian tribe" cases, Eleventh Amendment doctrine appeared to look this way. First, the amendment barred anybody or anything from suing a state in federal court, even when the question arises out of supposedly
superior federal law. The only exception might come from a
federal law intended to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
or from a situation where a plaintiff might be able to claim
that the state knowingly entered a federally regulated field
and thus waived its immunity. Furthermore, one might be
able to seek injunctive relief from an officer of the state, but
that depended at least in part on whether one could theoretically obtain a hearing in a state court (no matter how
unfriendly that might appear) and on how close to "core aspect of sovereignty" one's requests for relief cuts. That all
seems harsh enough for persons whose federally protected
rights have been hurt by the state, but the worst was yet to
come.
II. JUNE 23, 1999: THE RESULT OF ABANDONING THE TEXT
As seen above, the Eleventh Amendment expanded well
beyond its text in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but that expansion halted after the Principality
of Monaco decision. For nearly fifty years thereafter, nearly
all Eleventh Amendment decisions from the Supreme Court
175. Id. at 296.
176. Id.

456

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

focused on explaining and expanding the ameliorative doctrines that reduced the damage that the "parallel," nontextbound Eleventh Amendment could cause. By the beginning
of the last decade of the twentieth century one could look
with optimism at the prevailing Eleventh Amendment doctrine i 7 Especially after Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company
that amendment appeared nearly reduced to its
proper scope, to bar only those suits a proper, contextual
reading of the amendment would bar. Of course, the doctrines were unwieldy and overly complex, and could have
used a shave with Occam's razor to simplify them. Then, of
course, as the last decade opened, the Court's trilogy of "Indian cases"--Blatchford, Seminole Tribe, and Coeur
d'Alene-reversed that salutary course and began, once
again, to expand the parallel Eleventh Amendment and to
reduce and sometimes to reject altogether the ameliorative
doctrines that had softened the amendment's tendency to
destroy the rule of law.
In recent years the Court has shown a strong animus to
the First Nations in a variety of ways, not just in its decisions on the Eleventh Amendment. 17 It was open to question, therefore, whether the Court's three cases expanding
state immunity from tribal suit really reflected the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, or whether the Court
would begin to retreat from its embrace of state immunity
when cases arose in non-tribal contexts. The three decisions
decided at the end of the 1998-99 term show, however, that
not only does the Court read the Eleventh Amendment just
as expansively outside of the tribal context as in it, but indeed continues to expand state immunity.

177. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
178. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520
(1998) (refusing to allow a federally recognized tribe, owning its land in common
in fee simple, which provided the only local police services and utilities to its
villages, to claim the sovereign status that would accompany having its land
recognized as "Indian country"); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)
(refusing to allow a tribal court to take jurisdiction over an automobile accident
taking place on the reservation, between a contractor whose driver was only
driving on that road because he was engaged in a tribal building project and a
resident of a reservation whose family were all tribal members).
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A. The Patent Case: Even the FourteenthAmendment Fails
Two of the three decisions from June 23, 1999, arose out
of a dispute between College Savings Bank and the Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.179 One
decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the
College Savings Bank could not sue the Board for patent infringement, while the second, written by Justice Scalia,
held that the College Savings Bank could not bring Lanham
Act false advertising claims. Both show how significant
and far-reaching the impact of the Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe has proven to be.
Both cases arose out of the same facts. College Savings
Bank, from Princeton, New Jersey, sells CollegeSure certificates of deposit which are supposed to finance the costs of
college education. College Savings holds a patent on its
method of financing the certificates of deposit. 180 The Board
administers similar prepayment contracts available to
Florida residents and their children, pursuant to chapter
240.551(1) of the Florida Statutes."1 College Savings
brought suit in United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, claiming that the Board directly and indirectly infringed College Savings' patent, and also violated
the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its own
tuition savings plans in brochures and annual reports.'
Given Seminole Tribe's complete repudiation of the abrogation doctrine except for when Congress abrogates state
immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
patent case predictably turned around the nature of Congress's power to enact remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
found, in essence, that Congress had not jumped through
enough hoops before it enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy

179. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. (Patent Act), 119 U.S. 627 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
180. See College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 527 U.S. at 631 (demonstrating
that the Court did not question the validity of the patent); College Say. Bank
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 670-71 (demonstrating that the Court did not question the validity of that patent).
181. See College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 527 U.S. at 631 (citing FLA. STAT.
ch. 240.551(1) (Supp. 1998)).
182. See id. at 631-33 & n.1.
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Act"). While the Court agreed that patents are "property"
that are worthy of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court held that
Congress failed to establish before enacting the Patent
Remedy Act that states were violating patents and then
using sovereign immunity to deny the patentees due process for that deprivation of property.
Chief Justice Rehnquist readily acknowledged that
Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act for the clearly expressed purpose of abrogating state sovereign immunity
and subject states to patent infringement claims." It did so
under its Patent Clause'85 and its Interstate Commerce
Clause'86 powers found in Article I of the Constitution. 187 After Seminole Tribe, of course, those clauses of the Constitution cannot be the source of such power. However, the Congress also claimed to be acting under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'88 After all, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," and
section 5 states that "Itihe Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." If Congress acted within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it claimed, it could, even after Seminole
Tribe, force states to submit to suit in federal courts, apoint
which the Chief Justice again readily acknowledged.' Still
further, he acknowledged that patents "are surely included
within the 'property' of which no person may be deprived by
a State without due process of law."9 ' Yet he held that the
Patent Remedy Act was not an appropriate exercise of Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's section 5 jurisprudence was most recently
illustrated in City of Boerne v. Flores,19' a decision in which
the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
See College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 527 U.S. at 634.
U.S.CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 527 U.S. at 635.
See id. at 637.
See id. at 639.
Id. at 642.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Act'92 as a redefinition of a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a effort to enforce that
right. The Court's approach began with the observation that
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."' Of course, it is difficult to draw that
line between remedy and substance. What the Court looks
for, therefore, is a "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end."'94 In other words, Congress's actions
must be a fitting reaction to an identified constitutional
violation.
The Court's way to test the fit between remedy and
violation is to force Congress to "identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct."'Many others have criticized the
path down which this approach takes us, but it is beyond
the current scope of this article to criticize the Court's overall section 5 jurisprudence.9 What is within the scope of
this article, however, is to suggest that as the Court applies
that test to remedial legislation that abrogates state immunity, it appears its scrutiny of Congressional judgment is
strict indeed. As all with even a casual acquaintance with
"strict scrutiny" are aware, such scrutiny spells almost certain doom for any legislative scheme.'
The difficulty in distinguishing between a remedy for
rights and a redefinition of rights led to the stringent tests
enunciated in Boerne. After all, there the redefinition of the
free exercise right might diminish the complementary but
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
193. College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 157 U.S. at 638 (quoting City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 519).
194. Id. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
195. Id.
196. The Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
generated a great deal of such criticism already. See, e.g., 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. (printing the contributions to a symposium titled "A Reflection on City of
Boerne v.Flores").
197. It has been recognized for quite some time that, as far as strict scrutiny
is concerned, "strict" in theory is usually "fatal" in fact. See Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court:A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
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to some extent opposite establishment clause right. On the
other hand, in College Savings Bank there was not question
of "redefining" any rights. The right in question was the
right not to be deprived of what everyone agreed was a protected property interest without the due process of law.
There was no question that patents were property and that
Congress has the exclusive right to define that property.
The only question was whether a certain remedy was available. That is, the only definition involved (what process is
due) also was a question of remedy.
Testing the fit between the remedy found in the Patent
Remedy Act and the identified problem, as the Court applied that test, required an examination of what Chief Justice Rehnquist called "the record."'98 The opinion noted disapprovingly that "Congress came up with little evidence of
infringing conduct on the part of the States."'99 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that the bill's sponsors did not claim to
have any evidence of widespread violation of patent laws."'
Of course, that criticism of Congress alone would be an uncomfortable basis for a decision striking down the Patent
Remedy Act in a case where the state in fact appeared to be
violating patent laws. The Court was careful, however, to
identify what must be shown as more than just states infringing patents. What must be shown is state infringement
of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent
owners compensation for the invasion of their patent
rights.""' Thus the Court noted the testimony Congress
heard on whether, if a state violates a patent, the states
were claiming immunity and denying due process.0 2 The
fact that a state deprives one of property, even if it does so
wrongfully, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. Only if it does so and "provides
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent
owners for its infringement of property without due process" is Congressional action justified.2 3
Congress did identify at least two cases of patent infringement, one of which was the case that led to the Patent

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 157 U.S. at 639.
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 640.
See id.
Id. at 643.
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Remedy Act even being proposed. °4 Congress further heard
testimony that state remedies would be difficult to obtain,
hard to plead, and uncertain in application."5
These were not enough for the Court. What would have
been? Would, say, testimony of twenty cases, not two, been
enough? Would the Court have evaluated that testimony for
accuracy? Would testimony that state immunity had been
claimed in state courts been enough? Would anything have
been enough?
The Court itself did not even try to suggest that the
states provide sufficient process. Rather, it claimed it was
Congress's job to prove they did not.06 Ironically, of course1
the third case decided on June 23, 1999, Alden v. Maine,20
was in fact a prime example of a state claiming sovereign
immunity to deny a litigant due process and getting away
with doing so.
Nothing in the Court's analysis suggests that the result
would have been any different if College Savings Bank had
proven that, in fact, Florida not only infringed its patent
but that no state court action could properly enforce that
right. Indeed, the Court's analysis suggests that such proof
would be irrelevant. The Patent Remedy Act could be justified as a valid use of congressional enforcement power only
if Congress, at the time of enactment, had shown that
states infringed patents and used sovereign immunity to
get away with it.
The conjunction of Alden v. Maine and the College Savings Bank cases are quite telling. Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not hold that the Patent Remedy Act was an uncalledfor use of the enforcement clause because Florida in fact
provided a remedy of its own; he held that the Patent Remedy Act was invalid because at the time it was passed Congress did not establish a pattern of states infringing patents
and using sovereign immunity to get away with that infringement. After all, he wrote that the act could not pass
204. See id. at 640.
205. See id. at 643-44, especially n.8.
206. See id. at 643. Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed Congress's receipt of
testimony that the states may not provide remedies, or at least not adequate
remedies, for patent infringement, but he dismissed that testimony as "limited."
Id. The tenor of his remarks seems to be that it is up to Congress not only to articulate a reasonable concern for adequate process but to meet some burden of
proof on the issue.
207. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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muster because, "In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.,2 11 That suggests, first, that one or even a few times in
which states infringe patents and refuse to allow remedies
would not justify abrogation of state sovereignty, and second, that any proof of such state action cannot come from
events after enactment of the statute but from the "evidence" in front of Congress at the time the statute was enacted. Thus, if Florida not only chose to infringe on College
Savings Bank's patent but also made a claim of sovereign
immunity in any action brought in state court as allowed in
Alden, College Savings Bank is out of luck. Similarly, if the
state refused to allow itself to be sued in state court for unfair competition, the kind of thing the Lanham Act prohibits, the injured competitor is again out of luck. College
Savings Bank would be deprived of its property without any
process at all and would be subjected to illegal acts of competition without any legal recourse.
As the dissent pointed out, of course, patent law is complex, and the very definition of this species of intangible intellectual property depends on the law and its uniformity.
State decisions cannot be appealed to the court of appeals,
and although patent matters can be brought ultimately to
the United States Supreme Court, that Court does not hear
anywhere near all of the patent appeals that it could hear.
Indeed, that is why the Federal Circuit was created, because the Supreme Court could not by itself provide the
needed uniformity. 9 In other words, the property's protection depends on uniformity of law in a complex and specialized field; any remedy that does not provide such protection is necessarily inadequate.
The dissent's error, perhaps, was in arguing that the
Court had misunderstood the nature of the property right
at stake, the adequacy of the process available to the injured property-holder, and the proper way to evaluate legislation intended to aid such injured property-holder. The
key to the Court's opinion is found in its repetition of Seminole Tribe's bold assertion that the Eleventh Amendment
does not describe the boundaries of the state's sovereign
immunity, but only confirms a presupposition of a much
208. College Say. Bank (Patent Act), 157 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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broader immunity. 20 After all, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion was just one of three declaring state immunity from
suit-even when Congress thought it was doing so pursuant
to a valid power,2 1' even when the state was entering into a
commercial field in which other, non-governmental participants were federally regulated, even when the suit was
brought to enforce binding federal law in the state's own
courts.213

Again, it is not within the scope of this article to discuss
at length the Court's approach to testing Congress's power
to enforce rather than create Fourteenth Amendment
rights. One key part of that approach warrants a few remarks. A few paragraphs earlier, quotations from Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted his constant reference to
the "evidence" and the "testimony" found in the Patent
Remedy Act's legislative history. 2 A moment's reflection
shows how odd that approach is. The normal use of legislative history is to interpret a statute, in order to determine
what the statute means. Of course, even that use of "history" is problematic. 21 5' Here, however, the Court has no
question about what the statute means; legislative history
is being used to test not Congress's intent but whether it
did its job thoroughly enough. Congress is being put on
trial, and its case-in-chief is its legislative history. Moreover, it was not a fair trial; as the Patent Remedy Act was
enacted before either Seminole Tribe ended Congress's right
to abrogate under Article I and City of Boerne raised the
burden of proof for Congressional justification of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, Congress had no
idea what its case-in-chief must look like. In the Court's
new jurisprudence, the statute that all members of Congress votes on and enacts matters much less than the kind
of hearings and data a few committee members and their

210. See id. at 634.
211. See id.
212. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd.(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
213. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
214. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
215. This is one area where the author of this article and Justice Scalia

seemingly agree, if his recent book is any test. See

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MArER
OF INTERPRETATION 16-18 (1998). However, Justice Scalia did join Chief Justice

Rehnquist's opinion in the patent case despite its heavy and unusual use of
legislative history.

464

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

staffers can put together.
In fact, although whenever the Court wants to assure
its audience that the Fourteenth Amendment properly used
can abrogate state sovereign immunity it cites Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer 16 there is no reason to believe that the Court would
reach the same result in that case today. Fitzpatrick concerned a suit by state employees that the state's retirement
benefit plan discriminated against them because of their
sex-they were male-and they sought, among other items,
retroactive benefits. Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
writing for the then all-male Court found that Congress had
the power to authorize the employees to sue the state. He
did so because of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What is illuminating in comparing the Chief Justice's two
"Fourteenth Amendment abrogation" opinions is that in the
first one, Fitzpatrick, he made no reference whatsoever to
the legislative history. Nowhere in that short opinion does
he put the record on trial, searching for "evidence" that
Congress found of a pattern of state discrimination against
men or anyone else. Indeed, there may not have been such
evidence available, for as Justice Stevens wrote in his concurrence (arguing that the suit was acceptable under the
commerce power alone, without recourse to the Fourteenth
Amendment),
I do not believe plaintiffs proved a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and... I am not sure that the 1972 amendments [to
Title VII, the law at stake there] were "needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment;".... I question whether s 5
is an adequate reply to Connecticut's Eleventh Amendment defense.

There we have a friend of abrogation doubting whether
the law in question was "appropriate legislation" to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick, however, was decided well before the recent renaissance of state sovereign
immunity. Now, with the renewed emphasis on that immunity, and the Court's deep commitment to the principles of
state power, it is not clear at all that the Fourteenth
Amendment will ever be able to provide another example of
abrogation.
The contrast in how the two amendments are read is
216. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
217. Id. at 458.
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striking. The Eleventh Amendment is read so broadly that
its very text is irrelevant. The "principle" behind that
amendment has become a free-floating shield behind which
the states can hide all sorts of illegal activity. On the other
hand, the Court guards the boundaries of the proper scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment jealously. The broader principle that amendment enunciates seems lost in the mix altogether. The recognition that states must be called to account for the harms they can do to individuals, based on the
recognition that state governments can be just as likely to
harm unpopular minorities as any other majoritarian institutions, has been given short shrift.
B. The Lanham Act Case: States Are People, Too"'
Given the Court's view that even a patent infringement
action, which the Court acknowledged is a procedure to protect "property," is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, it
was almost a foregone conclusion that an action against a
state for unfair competition would also be barred. No constitutionally recognized property was involved, and certainly
Congress could not subject states to suit under its Commerce Clause powers by abrogating that immunity. Only
one small loophole remained for College Savings Bank, and
that is the claim that Congress regulated a commercial field
in which the state voluntarily entered, competing with private parties, and so when Congress made it clear that a
state that does so can be subject to suit for unfair competition under the Lanham Act, the state constructively waived
its immunity. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, dismissed that argument, and he did so on sweeping grounds,
rejecting the constructive waiver doctrine altogether.
Interestingly enough, although both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believe the Eleventh Amendment must be extended well beyond its actual terms, they
disagree on what those terms are. Justice Scalia has
adopted the acontextual approach, which has made it easy
for him to dismiss a textually faithful interpretation of the
218. When one wants to remind one's children to respect the feelings and
rights of others, one often reminds them that "Tommy and Jane are people, too."
This reminds the child that others have feelings that can be bruised and, on a
more abstract plane, the ethical priority we assign to other human beings as
moral ends in themselves. The current Supreme Court appears to believe both
things of states as well.
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text as inadequate. Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other
hand, appears to accept the contextual approach. In his
opinion on the patent case, the Chief Justice states that,
"Although the text of the amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says but for the presupposition... which it confirms."219 On the other hand, Justice
Scalia says something quite different, that the amendment's "precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits
brought against one State by citizens of another State or
foreign state...

,,220

This is quite different from barring

only diversity actions; it bars federal question cases as well.
It is notable that the same five justices joined in not only
the result but the opinions in both College Savings Bank
cases, although the two opinions enunciate different readings of the text of the Eleventh Amendment. Presumably
these five could do so because the text has become irrelevant. Indeed, Justice Scalia dismisses the text contemptu221
ously as "the narrow text of the amendment itself."

Given Justice Scalia's choice of the acontextual reading,
he then is able to sneer at the dissent by saying he found it
"puzzling that [the dissent] would choose this occasion to
criticize our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence as being
ungrounded in constitutional text, since the present lawsuit
[between Florida and a New Jersey company] seems to fall
four square within the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.... .222 Justice Scalia can state that the federal question case before the Court fell four square into that literal
text only because he insists on the acontextual reading of
the Eleventh Amendment, although not even all of his colleagues in the sovereign immunity romance would agree.
Justice Scalia states his rejection of the text in the same
sentence partially quoted above:
Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits
brought against one State by citizens of another State or foreign

219. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Patent Act), 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).
220. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999).
221. Id. at 688 n.5.
222. Id. at 689.
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state, we have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment accomplishes much more: It repudiated the central premise of Chisolm that the jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the
sovereign immunity that the States possessed before entering the
Union.3

Thus, the Eleventh Amendment no longer means what
it says, but what the Court believes its underlying principles would require. Therefore, in Justice Scalia's view, a
state's sovereign immunity is nearly absolute, as there are
"only two circumstances in which an individual may sue a
State," 24 Fourteenth Amendment abrogation and a state's
waiver of immunity. Given that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not enough to support College Savings Bank's patent
infringement claim against Florida, even though the Court
acknowledged a deprivation of property had taken place, it
is not surprising that Justice Scalia held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the power to
subject Florida to suit, for unfair competition is hardly remarkable.
The second circumstance in which a state may lose its
immunity is when that state waives it. However, that
waiver, according to Justice Scalia, must be "altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty."225 Indeed, Justice
Scalia equates such waiver with an individual's waiver of
constitutionally protected rights, such as a right to jury
trial, and noted that such waivers must always be carefully
scrutinized for voluntariness.226 The question, however, is
what "voluntary" means. While Justice Scalia expends some
effort proving waivers must be voluntary, he spends none
establishing that so-called "constructive" waiver is not.
Rather, it appears he is relying on labels-waivers must be
"voluntary," not "constructive" or "implied"-rather than
looking to the behavior that underlies those labels. The labels appear to describe different things, so Justice Scalia
leaves it at that. Yet in Pardenitself, the original "constructive waiver" decision, the Court never used that label.
223. Id. at 669.
224. Id. at 670. Justice Scalia's two circumstances do not include Ex parte
Young, even though the Court has long acknowledged that doctrine is in fact a
form of suit against the state.
225. Id. at 675 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S (20 How.) 527, 529

(1858)).
226. See id. at 681-82.
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In fact, Justice Scalia does not even bother to describe
the requirements of "constructive waiver of immunity," except in a brief and disparaging reference to College Savings
Bank's brief. In that brief, College Savings Bank pointed
out the clarifications and refinements of constructive
waiver that arose in the cases following Parden. These refinements include that Congress must: (1) have Constitutional authority to regulate a field-paradigmatically, interstate commerce; (2) have chosen to so regulate it-for
instance, with the Lanham Act; (3) have made it clear and
unambiguous that if a state entered that field it would be
subject to suit; and (4) the state must thereafter enter that
field. Moreover, that entry must be a real choice; constructive waiver would not apply to activities that a state must
do to be a government, such as run a police force. It only
applies to a choice to enter a field traditionally occupied by
non-governmental entities, with the best example the operation of a business for profit in the interstate commercial
marketplace over which Congress has plenary power. 27 Justice Scalia simply listed these characteristics enumerated in
College Savings Bank's and the United State's briefs, described them as "severely limiting" Parden, did not otherwise discuss them, and then said, "[w]e think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived,
and
see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of
, 228
it.

The cases which Justice Scalia saw as "limiting"
Parden,from which limitation he drew the conclusion that
these cases were rejecting Parden in piecemeal fashion,
could just as easily be seen as clarifying Parden and making
all the more clear that a "Parden-stylewaiver" is not actually constructive at all. These cases are the source of the list
of characteristics above, and all these characteristics do is
show rather dramatically that, when all those criteria are
met, a state would be engaged in rank hypocrisy to claim
immunity. The state, if it meets these criteria, truly made
an uncoerced choice to enter an area where others already
competed, knowing that Congress had made rules for that
competition and had made it clear that anyone, including
states, that wants to participate had to play by those rules.
227. The list in this paragraph is a paraphrase of the list from the brief that
Justice Scalia quotes. See College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 678-82.
228. Id. at 680.
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In other words, no one is forcing you to come to the Sunday
afternoon soccer games, but if you do come, you cannot get
away with holding your opponent's jersey. We call those
fouls.
The just-listed characteristics may or may not have "severely limited" Parden. That is irrelevant. The purpose of
these criteria is to ensure that the state's action could be
viewed as voluntary, to ensure that the act leading to
waiver involved a conscious choice that easily could have
been foregone. Florida made its choice to sell financial instruments knowing that it was competing with private
businesses, knowing that it was entering a competitive
marketplace, knowing Congress regulated behavior in that
marketplace, and knowing Congress fully intended to include states in that regulation up to and including subjecting states to a lawsuit for engaging in illicit behavior.
Justice Scalia's failure to examine the actual behavior
behind the label "constructive waiver" allowed him to assert
that "constructive waiver is little more than abrogation under another name." '2 9 Actually, establishing constructive
waiver requires much more than does abrogation. Abrogation operates on the premise that the states surrendered
those aspects of sovereignty that the Constitution assigns to
the federal government, such as the regulation of interstate
commerce. Therefore, the states also have surrendered their
sovereign immunity to the extent the lawsuit arises out of
those areas, like the regulation of interstate commerce, that
Congress controls. Constructive waiver, on the other hand,
operates on the premise that Congress has been given the
power to regulate activities in certain fields, again such as
interstate commerce. Therefore, if Congress makes it clear
that it intends all participants in that activity to be subject
to suit, including states, states later choosing to enter that
activity can be said to have waived any claims to immunity
for that activity. Justice Scalia's equation of the two doctrines is characteristic of the opinion as a whole; it is replete with careless analysis.
Constructive waiver applies to fewer state actions than
abrogation. For example, as will be seen in the discussion of
Alden v. Maine below,"s Congress's interstate commerce
clause power gave it the right to enact wage and hour leg229. Id. at 684.
230. See infra notes 252-76 and accompanying text.
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islation including a requirement that employers pay overtime. Under abrogation, Congress could also express a desire to subject states to suits in federal courts for failure to
pay overtime to its employees, but that power disappeared
after Seminole Tribe. On the other hand, since states do not
really choose to enter the field of having employees-that is
an inevitable part of performing even the most basic governmental tasks-it would be inappropriate to argue states
constructively waived immunity to suits by those employees.
When Justice Scalia says, "Parden-style waivers are
simply unheard of in the context of other constitutionally
protected privileges," 232 he is absolutely wrong. He can only
say that because he fails to address the behavior underlying
the label of "constructive" applied to Parden-style waivers.
Even the constitutional rights of an aggrieved individualsurely the most important category of constitutional privileges-can be deemed waived if that individual consciously
chooses to engage in behavior which he knows is inconsistent with that right. For example, the Seventh Amendment
guarantees a right to a jury in civil trials, an important individual right.' Yet that right is waived unless one demands a jury in a timely fashion. 34 That right is waived
unless one makes the effort to assert it. It is a right that
can be waived through inadvertence. The so-called "constructive waiver" doctrine provides states with much more
protection than that afforded the right to a jury trial.
The most telling point about Justice Scalia's incorrect
assertion that "other constitutional privilege" cannot be
waived "Parden-style"is his equation of people's rights with
state's rights. Justice Scalia's underlying bias toward what
this article calls the romantic view of states' rights is obvious from his discussion of the doctrine of constructive
waiver as it applies to various constitutional rights and
privileges. He cites several cases in a row to show that
courts do not lightly find and "do not presume acquiescence

231. Thus, the employees in Alden had to leave the federal system behind
after the decision in Seminole Tribe.
232. College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 681.
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
234. See FED. R. CIv. P. 38(d) ("The failure of a party to serve a demand as
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver
by the party of trial by jury.").
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in the loss of fundamental rights."235 In none of these citations about fundamental rights does he identify the actual
context of such quoted language-whose rights, and what
were they? Justice Scalia cites three cases,"' Johnson v.
Zerbst 237 Aetna Insurance Company v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash239 and Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utility
Commission of Ohio.239 In Johnson,the Court considered the
claim of a habeas corpus petitioner who claimed he was denied the assistance of counsel, and the Court noted that his
right would not be assumed lightly. Similarly, where Justice Scalia quotes Aetna Insurance Company v. Kennedy ex
rel. Bogash as stating "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver," he failed to complete the quote,
which was "courts indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver [of jury trial] ."24 Finally, in Ohio Bell Tele-

phone Company, the fundamental right in question was the
right to a hearing before being deprived of property-the
right to due process. The fundamental rights were rights of
private persons against the power of government.
Justice Scalia apparently sees no distinction in the constitutional scale between the rights of living human beings
and the "rights" of government. In fact, he states that
"State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by
jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected."24 ' That
may seem an innocuous statement to some, but to the
author it is frightening. The Constitution does indeed establish divisions of power between state and federal governments, both of which are created to serve the people. It
is, however, the people who are sovereign, and the people
who have fundamental rights. There are no states' rights in
this fundamental sense, only the rights of people. The Constitution is carefully written on this point. The only holders
of rights in the text are the people, individually and collectively. States have "powers," not rights. For example, the
text of the Ninth Amendment reads "The enumeration in
235. College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 682 (quoting Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 310 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
236. All are from 1937 or 1938-interesting choices.
237. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
238. 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
239. 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
240. Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
241. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999).
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the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to
2 42
deny or disparage others retained by the people."

On the other hand, the Tenth Amendment says "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 43
The Court's failure to see the distinction between people, who are the bearers of rights, and all other actors in
our Constitutional scheme, shows a basic collapse in its
Constitutional jurisprudence. The Court could learn from
one of the early great men of the court, Justice James Wilson, who wrote in Chisolm v. Georgia: "Man, fearfully and
wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect
Creator. A State, useful and valuable as the contrivance is,
is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance." 44
Although the particular result in Chisolm was overturned by the Eleventh Amendment, that result being that
diversity jurisdiction could be used to sue a state for its
debts in federal court, there is no reason to believe that Justice Wilson's recognition of the fundamental priority of the
people over the state was overturned. To the contrary, it is
even more important to assert that priority in the days of
necessarily larger and more active government than it was
two centuries ago.
As well as equating states' "rights" with those we ascribe to people, a notion that seems ominously antidemocratic, Justice Scalia also expresses an intellectually
dishonest view of precedent. Overturning earlier decisions,
the way Justice Scalia repudiated Parden and its progeny,
is certainly within the province of the Court, but it takes an
odd sort of courage to do so at the same time as one sings
praises to the doctrine of stare decisis. This, however, is
what Justice Scalia does. While he has rejected precedent
creating the abrogation doctrines and the constructive
waiver doctrines, and seems to be part of a majority that is
rewriting Ex parte Young into an unreliable balancing test,
he lauds the "venerable precedent" of Hans and rests his
position that the constitutional text can be ignored on "constitutional tradition and precedent as clear and conclusive,
242. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
244. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 425 (1793).
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and almost as venerable.., as Marbury v. Madison .... 245
Justice Scalia's insistence on the primacy of stare decisis in the same opinion as he admits that his reading of the
Eleventh Amendment "accomplished much more" than "its
precise terms,, 24 6-that is, he chooses to apply it to bar suits
that it does not by its own terms bar-is telling. It shows an
implicit acknowledgment that judicial behavior is vastly
more important than the Constitution judges purport to interpret.
Reliance on stare decisis always has been a rather erratic and result-oriented enterprise, and Justice Scalia's is
no different. He venerates, for instance, the century-old de2
cision of Hans v. Louisiana
' and the "still-warm" Seminole
8
Tribe, but for all intents and purposes he rejects and overrules Pardenv. Terminal RailroadCompany,... which he attacks as "at the nadir of our waiver (and, for that matter,
sovereign immunity) jurisprudence,"25 ° and attacks over
thirty years of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, from
1964 to 1996, as "the distorted view of Hans that prevailed
briefly [!] between Parden and Seminole Tribe."25 In addition, in Seminole Tribe, Justice Scalia joined an opinion
that explicitly overruled the "still-warm" Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas, and the next year, in Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, he joined an opinion that eviscerated an Eleventh
Amendment precedent every bit as venerable as Hans and
Ex parte Young. Of course, while attacking those who dissent from his opinion as being disrespectful of Hans, he
fails to see that they may well be respectful of Hans but
also the holdings and spirit of Ex parte Young, Parden, and
the thirty-two "brief' years between Parden and Seminole
Tribe which he so blithely dismisses as "distorted."
The second College Savings Bank decision joins the
ranks of other recent decisions, like Seminole Tribe, that
have repudiated the Court's own precedents as well as the
written text of the Constitution in order to be true to the
"spirit" of Hans v. Louisiana. That in turn was a decision
which the Court freely admits was itself based not on the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 688.
Id. at 669.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 676.
Id. at 688 n.5.
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written words of the Constitution but unwritten principles
the words supposedly only partially exemplify. The decision
illustrates, even more dramatically than its Patent Remedy
Act counterpart the, Court's commitment to the spirit behind the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which it perceives to be a broad principle of state immunity. This principle reflects an even broader underlying conception of the
state, not as a social and political construct, but a person
invested with rights and the need for dignity and respect.
This romantic reading of the Eleventh Amendment, however, is most boldly revealed in the last of the Court's June
29, 1999, decisions, Alden v. Maine.
C. Alden v. Maine: The "founders'understanding"
In Alden v. Maine, the Court held that the plaintiffs, all
probation officers for the state of Maine, all of whom took
their jobs believing that they were entitled to overtime pay
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, but all of whom
were cheated of that pay by their employer, had no recourse
anywhere-not in federal court and not in state court- to
enforce their rights to that pay. The Court gave little attention to the harm done to the plaintiffs. Rather, in an opinion
written by the justice who has seemed most intellectually
infatuated with state immunity, Justice Kennedy, the Court
presented the case as a dispute between the overweening
reach of federal power and states, the repository of true political accountability.
The irony of Alden runs deep. The plaintiffs obviously
rather would have brought their claim in federal court, as it
raised a federal question against the state. However, after
Seminole Tribe ended the abrogation doctrine, a claim
based on federal law enacted pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause had no chance to stay in federal court,
and indeed, an attempt to do so was dismissed. The plaintiffs then brought the FLSA action in state court, which had
concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. After Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, one might have thought the Court would
have approved this practice. As one reads Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, one cannot miss that opinion's clearly expressed preference for adjudicating claims
against the state in a state forum; Justice Kennedy suggested that suits under Ex parte Young should only be
brought if the better way, a state lawsuit, was unavail-
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able.252 Presumably, such suits were somehow less offensive

to a state's sovereign dignity. The Alden plaintiffs, having
lost their preferred forum, might have taken solace in Justice Kennedy's suggestions that it would be better anyway
for them to be in state court. Yet it was this same Justice
Kennedy who then informed them that they had no right to
be there, either.
Re-examining Coeur d'Alene Tribe in light of Alden v.
Maine-both decisions written by Justice Kennedy-reveals
an example of the Court holding out the hope of some relief
from the hardships of state immunity that in fact do not
exist. Justice Kennedy, while holding that a tribe could not
bring a suit of any type against the State of Idaho because
an action to settle boundaries too greatly impacted the
state's sovereignty (apparently unconcerned with what the
state's actions did to the tribe's sovereignty), did note that
the state allowed suits against itself in state court to quiet
title.253 That is a loophole that, after Alden, it is clear the
state could close down. In fact, it could allow most quiet title suits to go forward, but refuse to allow such suits only
when brought against the state based on titles allegedly
preceding the state's acceptance into the union; this would
foreclose the tribe's action while allowing other, less politically charged suits to go forward. Other states that feel
themselves burdened with too much Indian country could
do the same-encroach on those lands, make claims that
may or may not even be colorable, use their superior resources to take actions on such land, and refuse to waive
sovereign immunity to resolve such suits. Of course, the
United States could protect the tribes' territorial claims, but
it might not choose to do so, for reasons of politics or funding or Justice Department manpower. The tribes' rights are
only really rights if the tribe itself has the ability to seek a
remedy for the violation of those rights.
Justice Kennedy began his opinion with the most explicit statement ever made about the Court's complete indifference to textual fidelity. He explained that
[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is
limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution's structure, and its history, and the authoritative in-

252. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270-81 (1997).
253. See id.; see also IDAHO CODE § 5-328 (1990).
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terpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution .... 254

Thus, the Court explained that it would not "engage in

a historical literalism."255 Rather, "[t]he countours of
sovereign immunity are determined by the founders' understanding .... ,,56
The Alden approach to constitutional interpretation
gives rise to several questions. The first question being
whether the Court's history is accurate, or indeed whether
any court's amateur intellectual history could hope to be accurate, in gauging the "founders' understanding."2 57 A related question, indeed part and parcel of that first question,
is whether the Court's conclusions drawn on that history
are the only conclusions one could draw (assuming the accuracy of the history, as well as its relevance to Constitutional interpretation). The third question is whether it is
sufficient to look to only that one historical moment in Constitutional history. 25 8 Finally, and to the author most significantly, one must ask the question of whether any history, accurate or not, is or should in any way be binding on
constitutional interpretation.
...

1. The Court's use of history. Justice Kennedy
expended most of his opinion trying to prove that the
founding generation never intended for a state to be subject
to any private person's suit anywhere, and also trying to
explain away why, if they meant such a broad immunity,
the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment cast it in such
narrow terms. Interestingly, most of the more telling
pronouncements supporting a broad view of such immunity
that Justice Kennedy quotes are not from primary
historical documents but rather from other members of the
254. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
255. Id. at 730.
256. Id. at 734.
257. Indeed, it is far from clear that one could even identify with any certainty who the "founders" were, let alone what they thought. Both the original
Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment were ineffective until ratified by the
states-and there is very little historical evidence about the intentions of the
state ratifiers.
258. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:

TRANSFORMATIONS

(1998)

(discussing generally the theme of transformative constitutional "moments").
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Court in other opinions, all removed by centuries from the
actual events surrounding the drafting of the Constitution
and its Eleventh Amendment.
Just as interesting as what Justice Kennedy puts into
his opinion is what he left out. Although he argued from the
"founders' understanding" of both the Constitution and presumably of the Eleventh Amendment as well, he only
quotes from three of the state ratifying conventions, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island.25 The quoted language,
read in original context, all appear to have arisen out of a
fear of states being sued in federal court to enforce the
states' bond obligations-suits that would arise under the
federal court's diversity jurisdiction if at all. For example,
the only portions of actual ratification debate the Court
quotes are from Virginia, in which James Madison spoke
and John Marshall "provided immediate support."26 ° Yet the
very beginning of James Madison's statement, which the
Court in fact quotes, was, "Its [the federal judicial power]
jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of
another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason."261 Again, the only quoted language concerned the use

of the federal diversity jurisdiction to force states to pay
their debts. This quoted language never intimates that the
ratifiers had a problem with a suit by a state's own citizens
against the state, which necessarily would arise under federal question jurisdiction.262
The language Justice Kennedy quotes from the Federalist Papers, language which in fact is the source for the
current Court's favorite phrase, that states retained their
immunity: "Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with
the States, ,263 is followed immediately by this language:
There is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their
own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that
which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience
of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Alden, 527 U.S. at 717-25, 734.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
See id. at 760-66, especially 766 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 717 (quoting the Federalist No. 81).
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They [those contracts] confer right of action independent of the
sovereign Will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits
against2 States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? 6

The quoted language shows that the focus of discussion
was about actions to enforce debt, and at least part of Alexander Hamilton's argument is not about federal jurisdiction, but the substantive law of contracts between a sovereign and an individual. To the extent that it is about federal
jurisdiction, it is about whether that jurisdiction encompasses nonconsensual suits to collect a debt-which would
arise under the Court's diversity jurisdiction. All of the
primary historical evidence cited by the Court, which is
precious little, appears to be much like the quoted language
from the Federalist Papers-evidence that the proponents
of the Constitution were assuring their audiences that the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts would not be used
to enforce state debts. Moreover, the heavy reliance on the
Federalist Papers (a common habit of the Court's) is historically problematic, as the Federalist Papers were the "frank265
est, the baldest and boldest propaganda, ever penned."

At one point in the opinion, Justice Kennedy explained
"the founders' silence" on whether the states could be forced
to hear cases against themselves in their own courts, as
based on the fact that no such thing was ever contemplated.266 That may be true, but arguing from no evidence is
always a risky thing. What the Court failed to explain is the
founders' silence on much of any kind of suit against the
states in federal courts apart from a diversity suit used to
enforce state debts.
The Court disparages the dissent's evidence, offering a
contrary reading of historical understandings
as based on
2 7
"scanty and equivocal evidence.... .

The evidence that

Justice Kennedy cites also is scant and is equally equivocal.
Although, for reasons stated below, this article contends
that the historical approach of both opinions is wrongheaded, it is worth noting that the dissent's use of primary
264. Id. (quoting Federalist No. 81).

265. MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMiERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-81
5 n.7 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1970).
266. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
267. Id. at 726.
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historical evidence exceeds that of the majority opinion. It is
not history as historians do it, but history as the Romantic
Movement used it, an idealized and over-simplified backdrop to support one's exaltation of the romantic theme.
Moreover, the Court's romantic use of history is matched by
its romantic exaltation of mood over intellectual method in
dealing with the dissent. The dissent, written by Justice
Souter, noted that at the time of the Constitution's drafting,
sovereign immunity was supported by two political theories.
One view was that it was a common law immunity defeasible by statute,268 which Justice Souter argued was the most
popular theory.269 Under that theory, "state sovereign immunity could not have been thought to shield a State from
suit under federal law on a subject committed to national
jurisdiction by Article I of the Constitution." ° The other
theory was the natural law theory, which held "that immunity was inherent in a sovereign because the body that
made a law could not logically be bound by it." 1 Under that
theory, a state would have no immunity from a question
arising out of a binding federal statute. The Court made no
attempt to refute the contention that these were the two
possible understandings of the sovereign immunity of
states, nor did it refute the dissent's logic. As true romantics, the Court swept logic aside. Instead, it simply explained that it does not matter what the source of the principle embodied in the Constitution is, now that the principle
is a part of the Constitution."2 But if the text itself does not
state this broad principle, and it must be inferred from the
"founders' understanding," then the dissent is entirely correct that to know what the immunity is, we must know the
intellectual theory the founders were using.
The Court's historical method thus appears severely
compromised. On the one hand, it claims to be searching for
the "founders' understanding," but on the other hand it rejects the dissent's review of that understanding as not just
incorrect but irrelevant. The historical evidence the Court
does use is scanty, and only seems to establish that some
influential people who recorded their views, or whose views
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id. at 764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 734.
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were recorded by others, believed that the new Constitution
did not grant the federal courts the power to use their diversity jurisdiction to hear suits against states brought by
the states' creditors under state laws of assumpsit. To extrapolate beyond that issue is not history, but imaginative
fiction of the sort associated with science fiction involving
time machines.
The Court in fact proves its history is mere speculation,
although it may not have realized that. Justice Kennedy
wrote that in the Eleventh Amendment, "Congress chose
not to enact language codifying the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity but rather to address the
specific provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification
debates and formed the basis of
273
the Chisolm decision."

In other words, the Court admits that the Eleventh
Amendment only addresses certain specific concerns.
Therefore, the only evidence it has of a view the founders
shared of state sovereign immunity is evidence that they
did not approve of the use of diversity jurisdiction to collect
a state's debts, so that is all the Eleventh Amendment addressed. The Court produced no evidence that any other
type of sovereign immunity that may or may not have been
thought to be part of the constitutional scheme. Moreover, if
the amendment was narrowly drawn to address only the
problem that arose in Chisolm, because no one even considered the possibility of other suits of other sorts that challenged state immunity, one must explain why the drafters
of the Eleventh Amendment so completely ignored the language in Chisolm that quite clearly contemplated many
other types of federal actions against states.274 If they
wanted not only to forbid suits on debts against states, at a
time when they were writing an amendment to overrule its
result, why did not they write it that way?
In discussing the Eleventh Amendment's scope in the
Lanham Act version of College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia
wrote that despite the limited reach of its language, "the
Eleventh Amendment accomplished much more: It repudi273. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
274. The examples of potential federal suits against states brought up in the
opinion in Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), include suits for the impairment
of contracts, the very source of plaintiffs claim for federal jurisdiction in Hans
v.Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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ated the central premise of Chisolm that the jurisdictional
heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity
that
2 75
the States possessed before entering the Union."

If that is the central premise of Chisolm, which I believe it is, and if the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
repudiate that far-reaching premise altogether, why did not
its Drafters write it that way?
If one is to rely on history for interpretive technique,
one might point out that a majority of the Supreme Court
justices at the time of the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment would have disagreed violently with the propriety of such a far-reaching change in the Constitution.
These men could not have been nominated to and confirmed
in that exalted position by being on the lunatic fringe of political opinion. These men had only been in that position a
few years, so it is hard to believe that their views had diverged too greatly from the shifting tides of political opinion
(as, say, the "Nine Old Men" of the Depression era had diverged from the shifts reflected in the New Deal). The fact
that a majority of the justices ruled as they did in Chisolm
suggests that the political center of the early federal center,
while being disturbed by "commonplace suits on debts"
against states in federal courts, would have been disturbed
as well by the breadth of sovereign immunity the current
Court reads into the text.
2. The Court failed to use all the right history. Even assuming history is more significant than the text of the Constitution in determining the scope of state immunity, the
Court has failed to explain why it relied on only one part of
that history. The history from the first twenty years of our
nation's life may shed some light on one view of federal and
state powers and privileges. The history from the Civil War
and the Reconstruction era would reveal a very different
point of view, one that has been incorporated into our Constitution. It is far from clear that the "founders' understanding" of 1798, to the extent it creates extra-textual protection for states, ought to weigh more heavily than the
understanding of the refounders of the United States after
the Civil War.
In Alden, the Court acknowledged that, at least in the275. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999).
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ory, "appropriate" legislation pursuant to the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate state
sovereignty. 76 However, look at how that abrogation works.
If a statute is clearly a case where the specific enforcement
power of the Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked, and
invoked specifically to enforce, but not define, the rights the
Fourteenth Amendment protects, and Congress "proves" the
enforcement is needed to remedy an existing pattern of
state violation of those rights, only then can a state's immunity from suit be abrogated. That is to say, the Fourteenth Amendment's text is read in as limited a way as possible to make it as hard as possible for the power that text
grants to overrule the state immunity where that immunity
by and large is not based in the text at all. In understanding the zeitgeist that the Eleventh Amendment only "exemplifies," the Court looks well beyond the text. Moreover, the
Court enforces that zeitgeist. But if the Court uses "history"
to seek the "founders' understanding" of the nature of state
and federal sovereignty at the end of the eighteenth century, why does it give so little weight to the "founders' understanding" in the middle of the nineteenth century of the
nature of state and federal power as they can act against
the rights of the people?
What if we read the Fourteenth Amendment as only an
exemplification of broader principles themselves unarticulated in the text? That amendment could be read to exemplify the principle that states are not the ultimate sovereign, but the people are. It could be read to exemplify the
principle that the people are not homogeneous and some of
those sovereign people may not be popular with the dominant set of the people, but that even the unpopular require
protection. It could be read to exemplify the view that the
states are not any more naturally accountable to or responsive to the needs of the people than the federal government,
and that the states no less than the federal government can
abuse their power to cheat the people. What if we saw the
"broader principle" of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
empowerment of the people, taken one person and community at a time, against the states?
Given the Court's recognition that the Civil War worked
a great change in the nation's balance of power, it is odd
that it does not see the extent to which that balance has
276. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
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changed. It reads the Eleventh Amendment for principles
broader than that found in the text. It seems more than
clear that it should read the Fourteenth Amendment, which
contains much more sweeping language, language much
more inviting of a search for broader principles, as enunciating principles behind the text at least as far-reaching as
those "exemplified" by the Eleventh Amendment.
The potential for extensive federal actions intended to
protect or create personal rights came into being through a
constitutional and historical event at least as important as
the "Founding" Era, the Civil War, and the Civil War
Amendments. Given that the three opinions focus on federal-state relations, and the fact that one of the opinions
was as much about the Fourteenth Amendment as the
Eleventh Amendment, there was astonishingly little discussion of the post-Civil War Reconstruction of not only our nation but of the Constitution. The asymmetry of the discussion of Founding Era history and Reconstruction Era
history is striking. The Founding Era is discussed not only
for the words it put into a text, but also for all its supposed
assumptions and political presuppositions and the full
range of its world-view. On the other hand, the equally important era that gave us the Fourteenth Amendment was
discussed only in terms of the actual amendment itself; the
Court felt no need to plumb the depths of that era's worldview, political presuppositions, or patience with claims of
states' rights.
In any case, the Reconstruction Era gave us constitutional amendments... and related statutes218 that created
the potential to completely alter not only the balance of federal and state power, but also to radically change the nature of the purposes for which federal power may be used.
The federal power now reaches inside the states for the
purpose of assisting, for example, freedmen and women exert civil and political rights over against the states. These
states were no longer viewed as necessarily the guarantors
of those rights but perhaps the enemies of those rights.
That potential for federal power was, admittedly, largely
untapped after a brief flurry during the Reconstruction, in
part because of a Supreme Court hostile to a new federal
277. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV (enacted in 1865, 1868, and 1870

respectively).
278. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1999).
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era. It was substantially later before the federal government began to actualize this potential-and thus the
growth27of
9 the ameliorative doctrines, especially Ex parte
Young.

None of the evidence cited in Alden about the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment addressed the very question the
case concerned, which is whether a state court must hear a
claim against that state based on federal law that is admittedly binding on the state. As Justice Kennedy admitted,
"the Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme Law of
the Land' only those federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design,"28" which means that a state is bound to
apply in its own courts all valid federal law, because "[t]he
Supremacy
Clause does impose specific obligations on state
•,,21
judges.
One such obligation is that state courts must
comply with and enforce federal law, and when a court is a
court of general jurisdiction, it must entertain federal
causes of action 2 2 because the Supremacy Clause "charges
state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that
law according to their regular modes of procedure."2

3

There

is nothing new about this requirement that states follow
federal law wherever it leads. There also is nothing new
about the requirement that state officials must enforce
binding federal law. Furthermore, there is nothing new
about subjecting those officials to suit for injunctive relief,
or the state as a whole to suit by the United States itself to
enforce its law against recalcitrant state governments. All
that is new is that in Alden, the state court enforcing federal law is asked to enforce it against the state itself, not at
the behest of the United States, but the individual whom
the United States has empowered. The question one must
ask then is why is that last wrinkle new?
As the Court noted in Seminole Tribe, "the federal
courts did not have federal question jurisdiction at the time
the amendment was passed (and would not have it until

279. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). One should note that the Alden Court needed Ex
parte Young, an admitted fiction allowing that result the Court claims is so unthinkable-suits against an unwilling state-in order to make the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity at all palatable.
280. Alden, 527 U.S. at 731 (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 924 (1997)).
281. Id. at 753.
282. See id. at 800 (Souter, J., dissenting).
283. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
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1875) ....")28
Think about what that means. It means that if a valid
federal statute were enacted, at any time before 1875, any
suit founded on that statute would go to state court for
trial. Indeed, the annals of the United States Reports are
replete with just such state court suits involving federal
questions which were appealed to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error. If that statute governed the
relations between a state and a private party, any suit by
that private party would be brought, not in federal court,
but in state court. That is, until 1875-a significant year, a
year in which the sea change in federal-state relations
brought on in the Civil War's aftermath was still in process.
Why then did the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment
fail to address a suit in state court? Why then did none of
the evidence anyone cited in any opinion ever discuss such
a possibility? Why, indeed, was Alden a case of first impression? What then is new about the federal law in question to
give rise to this issue of first impression? It is that the federal law is an exercise of federal power that the founders
never would have considered using (nationally regulating
wages and hours in private employment). The reason the
case arises is not a less deferential view of sovereign immunity in today's Congress but a changed understanding of
federal power.
Assuming that Justice Kennedy's history is correct, it
shows that in the time of the founders, two hundred years
ago, states assumed they were immune in their own courts
from claims against them predicated on their own laws;
they were later outraged that they could be brought into
another court to answer to those same sorts of claims. At
the time of the founders, states also agreed to apply federal
law when relevant in their own courts" 5 and agreed that the
federal government could assert its law against recalcitrant
states in federal courts.8 6 On the other hand, federal claims
against the states by private individuals invoking federal
law were not very likely to arise. First, this is because at
the time the Eleventh Amendment was written, the scope of
potential federal law was more restricted then than after
the Civil War Amendments, with little of the federal gov284. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996).
285. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Howlett, 496 U.S. at 357.
286. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
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ernment's affirmative power being directed towards the
protection of private rights. Just as important, however, is
that both federal and state governments were controlled by
men who imagined governments engaged in far fewer activities than today's governments. History becomes time
travel science fiction when one imagines how someone
would have reacted to an issue that was inconceivable to
him.287 To the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment, neither
the scope of the federal government's regulation of the
workplace nor the wide array of state activities in interstate
commerce would have crossed their minds.
Alden is a case that only could have arisen in the twentieth century, after two events that the Court leaves out of
its history. The first event is a constitutional "founding"
every bit as important as the first in 1789, and that event
was the Civil War, the changes in attitudes and perceptions
about state and federal powers it engendered, and particularly the Civil War Amendments, most particularly the
Fourteenth Amendment. The second event is not directly a
"constitutional founding," but a real world event that the
Constitution could not survive unless the Constitution were
not flexible enough to adapt to it.28 8 That event could be lo-

calized to the New Deal, but a better way to look at it is the
twentieth century, a century in which ever greater complexity and scope of economic activity led to an ever more
active government at all levels, local, state and federal. It
was a century in which the interaction between governmental action and private enterprise, once hidden behind the
mask of familiarity and regularity which led to invisibility,8 9 have become open, obvious and dynamic. Or to put it
simply, governments at all levels do a lot more than they
used to do.
287. We certainly must use the pronoun "him," not the more common law
review "her," to refer to a member of that amorphous group we call the founders. Whatever or whoever else they were, they were all men, all white, and all
relatively wealthy.
288. See ACKERMAN, supra note 258 (describing the New Deal as a "constitutional moment").
289. This describes a situation in which a new wave of romantics looks back
nostalgically at a time when government did not "interfere" with the market, a
romantic view of history because it is to them beautiful but quite false. Government has always been inextricably entwined with economic activity. It just
has been easy to overlook it when we are too familiar with arrangements to realize they are a construct of society, not the gift of nature-a romantic's common failing.
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It took both of these events to make Alden. It took the
Civil War to create the first great test of the Eleventh
Amendment, Hans v. Louisiana,because only the Civil War
led to the creation of federal question jurisdiction for the
lower federal courts. It took the Civil War, more significantly, to give us the vast body of case law arising under Ex
parte Young. It took the Civil War to give us the great fiction we need for nearly every lawsuit brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, that the defendant-a policeman, a city, a
college, a school district-is not "the state" for purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment, but that same defendant's actions are "state actions" for purposes of finding a constitutional violation. As the Court acknowledged in Seminole
Tribe, the Civil War and the Civil War Amendments, especially the Fourteenth, "by expanding federal power at the
expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution."290
What the Court neglected to mention is the purpose for
which that balance was changed-it was changed for the
purpose of protecting people against the state. When the
Constitution was adopted, it appears all the attention was
being paid to the federal government, and all the fears were
focused on protecting "We the People" from that government's overreaching, but after the Civil War, it was all too
apparent that the states needed watching too. That is why
the Eleventh Amendment came to life after the Civil War,
because only that war opened up new avenues which Article
III jurisdiction could be called upon to make states into defendants in federal court. Before the Civil War, the federal
government regulated commerce for the good of the nation
as a whole; after the Civil War, the federal government protected individual people against their local governments.
That is a change of great significance.
It also took the growth in the scope of the states' governmental activities to create the situations that arose in
the College Savings Bank and Alden cases. Even before the
Civil War there were some rare instances where the federal
power directly protected individual rights. Ironically
enough, one such instance is found in the Patent Clause. In
other words, the federal right to protect the interests College Savings Bank asserted has been around for two centu290. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
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ries. That clause gives the federal government the right to
regulate patents and grant inventors protection; similar
powers were given the government to protect copyrights.
Now, two hundred years later, both patent law291 and copy-

right law292 are buzzing with what to do with states that in-

fringe patents and copyrights. The fact that in all that time
the right to sue a state for infringing a patent only recently
became a matter of controversy shows the other side of the
coin from the growth of federal power to protect individuals;
it shows the growth in the scope of governmental activities
in which federal, state, local and tribal governments now
engage, a breadth of activities that the "founders" could not
have imagined. The more the government does, sometimes
in direct competition with private companies and citizens,
the more uncomfortable must the claim of sovereign immunity become.
The reason these questions only now arise is that we
live in an era the "founders' understanding" could never
have understood. We live at the end of one century and are
heading into another in which government activities seem
to be inevitably more wide-ranging, further involved in
what once were thought to be exclusively private activities,
than the founders could have conceived. At the same time,
we live in an age that believes that any government needs
to be held accountable for what it does when it enters these
fields. The history that gave us these facts-activist state
governments that require more accountability-should not
be ignored.
3. Should we care about history? Historical research
and analysis, carefully and properly done, can be very
illuminating and probably quite useful in all forms of
intellectual endeavor, including law, as long as one
recognizes that historical "truths" are never irrevocably
established, always remaining provisional and subject to
revision. Thus, historical analysis can inform constitutional
291. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. (Patent Act), 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
292. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995). In
that case, the Court of Appeals first ruled in 1995 that a state university did not
have immunity from a suit for copyright infringement. See id. The Supreme
Court remanded the matter to the Fifth Circuit after the Court decided Seminole Tribe, and on remand the Fifth Circuit held the state university was immune. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1998).
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analysis, but only in a provisional way. For two reasons,
however, such historical analysis can never determine
constitutional analysis.
The first reason is epistemological. Legal disputes require decisions, not the reservation of judgment until all the
facts are in, although all the facts are never in when history
is being done well. An idealized "spirit of the age" might reveal what the "founders" understood in some corporate way,
but real history can only reveal the vast diversity of opinion
and the wide range of ambiguity in the thought of various
real people and groups of real people in the late eighteenth
century. The "founders" are a mythic construct. We can
learn a great deal about Thomas Jefferson or John Marshall, including a great deal about their expressed opinions
on political matters, but we can never learn anything about
the "founders."
The second reason historical analysis can never bind us
is that it should not bind us. There is a reason constitutions
are written and a reason why we can be so proud that we
were the nation that led the way in writing our Constitution down. After artful drafting, political compromising, including occasional studied ambiguities to leave exact methods of governance to be worked out among different
plausible options and a great deal of non-specific language
to allow a great deal of future flexibility to deal with unforeseen future developments, the only thing anyone
adopted is the text.
The Anglo-American tradition's greatest contribution to
world democratic practice is constitutionalism. The special
American contribution is our reliance, not on the "unwritten" common-law constitution, but an easily accessible written one. Nothing in the document has contributed as much
as the fact that the document is just that: a document written down, a text all can read.
Here we must distinguish between "constitutional law"
and "Constitutional law." The former is law about the basic
constitutive principles which participants in a political/legal
system accept as binding, even if the participant dislikes
them. "Constitutional law" concerns law derived from the
written text, capitalized because it refers to a proper noun,
the United States Constitution. It may or may not be that
the two--"constitutional law" and "Constitutional law"--are
co-extensive, but logically they are distinct.
Our second greatest, closely related contribution is that
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our constitution is not overwritten. It is relatively short, it is

concise, it does not attempt to detail what to do in every
conceivable situation, unlike a number of other constitutions currently extant, including many state constitutions.
The Constitution is specific on certain points (for example,
it details exactly when the President's term of office begins
and ends, and exactly how many members of Congress
there can be). On the other hand, much is left unsaid, even
on points not generally conceived to be sweeping and grandiose. For example, Congress has the exclusive power to
coin money, but exactly what that means is not detailed,
which lack of detail has allowed financial systems to develop without hindrance from Constitutional limitations.
In addition, some of the language is quite sweeping; to
take it seriously is to be forced to search for broader principles, and to work those principles out without guidance
from the Constitution itself. In some instances we have accepted the challenge, while in others we have not done so.
For example, to some degree we have accepted the challenge of determining what it means not to allow government to act to deprive people of life, liberty, and property
without accountability through legal process; on the other
hand, we have largely abandoned any pretense of discovering what the federal guarantee of a republican form of government in the states might entail. 93 Such clauses make it
impossible to be faithful to the text and at the same time
what the Senate always purports to be looking for in judges,
what it once was fashionable to call a "strict constructionist." It is impossible to "just" apply the law when the law
demands that we make decisions about basic matters of
principle. Taking the text seriously precludes the Constitutional equivalent of fundamentalist biblical literalism. Both
biblical fundamentalism and Constitutional fundamentalism require one to take the word "literally" by in large part
ignoring what the words actually say. In the case of the
Constitution, taking the text seriously means accepting that
we must interpret that text, which means making choices.
We cannot avoid those choices by pretending we are bound

293. The reasonably sophisticated layperson might argue that a "republican
form of government" requires not only widespread voting rights but such other
things as the right to call the government into account for injuries it has donelike cheating someone of overtime pay or stealing someone's intellectual property.
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by extratextual (and mythical) original intent.
D. What The Three DecisionsHave In Common: A Grand
Romance
All three decisions reflect the Court's romanticism
about state sovereign immunity, as well as the Court's romance with that immunity. The Court's three opinions reflect its romanticism in two key ways. First, all three show
a preference for the "founders' understanding" over written
Constitutional text. That is, all three opinions prefer the
"spirit" over the "letter" of the law. That spirit, the "founders' understanding," is not the result of a careful historical
analysis but is itself a romantic construct. The Court does
not derive the "founders' understanding" from the evidence
but marshals what evidence it can to support its almost
mystical concept of that understanding.
Second, all three show a commitment to the "state" conceived as a Romantic ideal, reflecting Continental Romanticism's Hegelian influence. Like Hegel, the Court idealizes
the state as a person, which subsumes the individual. That
state "personage" allows the Court to mischaracterize the
interests their opinions serve, by pretending to be protecting the state David from the federal Goliath, while in fact
defending the state Goliath against the private person
David. In casting the decisions as a fight between the state,
which it tends to characterize romantically as "politically
accountable,"294 and the federal government, which it tends
to characterize as distant and domineering, the Court misstates the obvious. The federal government is not a party to
these suits. They were suits brought by private persons
against the power of the state, and the Court made sure
these private persons lost.
1. The "founders' understanding" as Romantic
construct. The "founders' understanding" is not, of course,
the result of historical research and analysis as those terms
are used by contemporary historians. Rather, it represents
the "spirit of the age" of the Federal Era, as the Court
chooses to see that spirit. The most striking confirmation of
294. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (characterizing the state's political processes as "the heart of the political accountability so essential to our
liberty and republican form of government").
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that fact is that the Court never even tries to identify whose
understanding they have divined; that is, who were these
founders? Were they a certain particular group of
propertied, white, mostly Protestant men or were they,
generally, all white, propertied Protestant men in the
country, whose political theory all coalesced into one
simple-to-grasp principle of state sovereign immunity that,
for some reason, they chose never actually to articulate?
And are we comfortable being bound by the opinions of the
ruling elite of two centuries ago?
The Court does not seem to be concerned with identifying these founders, however. The phrase "founders' understanding," being a romantic construct nearly synonymous
with "spirit of the age," represents something much grander
than a prosaic polling of the Federal Era politically active.
The "founders' understanding" is something unbound by
mere empirical evidence because it represents a motive
spirit above and behind experience.
If we were to look at the politically active minority,
whose views plausibly could be characterized as the "founders" views, the evidence reveals a diversity of opinion that
defies the attempt to construct one simple vision of state
sovereignty and immunity. Some of those propertied Protestant white men believed that in a new federal system the
states surrendered their sovereign immunity in federal
courts more or less altogether, such as the majority in Chisolm as well as the Attorney General of the United States
at the time of Chisolm, who argued in Mr. Chisolm's behalf.
Events proved their view to be the minority one, but was it
entirely aberrant? On the other hand, it appears others
viewed the principle of state sovereignty as an overriding
one that was in fact greater than any expressed Constitutional text, a view much like the one the Court now views
as the "founders' understanding."
Still others may have believed, less sweepingly, that it
would be a bad idea to allow citizens to sue states on claims
based on state law without the state's consent, especially
when the states were new and fragile entities with large
debts that needed to be adjusted. That minority belief is the
only understanding for which there is unambiguous support, as it is the result the Eleventh Amendment, under any
of the likely readings, must require. It is also a direct reversal of Chisolm, which the historical evidence shows was the
purpose of introducing the amendment.
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In fact, the only evidence of what a majority of white,
propertied, mostly Protestant men willing and able to take
an interest in political affairs after Chisolm understood to
be the proper scope of state immunity in federal court is the
text of the Eleventh Amendment. All else is conjecture.
Therefore, one must conclude that, along with the
"founders," the Court has also constructed the "understanding" those founders had, that an understanding that
flies much higher than the only actual example of that understanding we have, the text we have been given. The
Court never fully explains why, if the Eleventh Amendment
reflects a broader view of sovereign immunity than is found
in the words of that amendment, the drafters did not just
write that broader principle into the text. To do so would
have been easy. Indeed, given the obvious evidence before
them, that unless the principle of state sovereign immunity
were explicit, it would be challenged in federal court,295 and
given the ease with which the far-reaching principle the
Court believes was the "founders' understanding" could
have been written, why is it that the Eleventh Amendment's actual text is so limited?
2. The Hegelian state. The Court's creation of a
"founders' understanding" made possible the Court's
discovery of principles that cannot be found in the text of
the Constitution, yet are more binding on us than the text
itself. The principle in question, of course, is a state
sovereign immunity that almost entirely exempts states
from judicial accountability for their actions unless they
consent to be accountable. That principle, in turn, only
makes sense in light of the Court's Hegelian view of the
state, not as a political construct of the people, but as a
sovereign person in its own right, with rights superior to
those of any other persons. In this view, that person gives
the full expression to the will of the people and in fact
enables the individuals born into its protection the ability to
fully express themselves and be free. Hegel held that it is
"only as one of [a state's] members that the individual

295. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), was not the only case
brought in federal court attempting to get around state sovereign immunity before the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, so Chisolm cannot be seen as an
anomoly. See, e.g., Vanstorphorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791); Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
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himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an
ethical life." 96 Similarly, the Court seems to hold that only
when the state-or as the Court would write, the "State"is unfettered by judicial attacks on its "dignity" are the
people able to be fully free because the State expresses their
will.
The Court develops its Hegelian view in each of the
June 29, 1999, opinions, but in each it does so differently. In
the Chief Justice's opinion in the patent case, he expresses
that view through an unbounded view of state sovereign
immunity unlimited by the text of the Eleventh Amendment, while taking a very stingy view of the limits of state
power expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. In Justice
Scalia's opinion in the trademark case, he equates the
"rights" of states with the rights of persons, and in fact subscribes the states greater rights. Finally, Justice Kennedy
in Alden, unfettered at all by any pretense of interpreting
the Constitution's text, is free to base his opinion entirely
on ideology, and thus give the most striking expression of
Hegelian political commitments.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of states' "rights," as expressed in the Patent Remedy Act version of College Savings Bank, is found in the structure of his analysis. As was
discussed above,... he first enunciated a respect for state
immunity unbounded by the text of the Constitution. By
contrast, he established a uniquely difficult text for the justification of federal protection of individual rights against
the state. Bear in mind, unlike City of Boerne v. Flores,298
there was no dispute about the definition of the personal
right involved. Patents are property and deserve due process protection. The only dispute was whether these defined
rights can in fact be protected. Yet the Chief Justice's opinion applied the test for whether Congress really had Fourteenth Amendment power so stringently that it appears
likely no attempt to protect individual rights will outweigh
the state's "right" to be immune from suit.
Justice Scalia's opinion in College Savings Bank (the
Lanham Act case) revealed his Hegelian view of the state in
more explicit terms. As noted above, he failed to see any
296. EBENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 618.
297. See Florida Prepaid Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank
(Patent Act), 527 U.S. 627, 634-35 (1999).
298. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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distinction between the constitutional status of human
rights and state "rights." After all, when he wrote that
courts "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights," the rights he contemplated were those of
states.299 Yet the cases he cited about fundamental rightsJohnson v. Zerbst,.. Aetna Insurance Company v. Kennedy
ex rel. Bogash30 1 and Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Public
Utility Commission of Ohio3°--all involved the rights of individuals to be secure against the overbearing state. Justice
Scalia ignored this distinction, because his "State" is just
like a person, only writ large and, one suspects, better than
a flesh and blood person.
Justice Scalia's Hegelianism also was reflected in his
attacks on the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, which
he interpreted as an attack on federalism. He found it
alarming to learn that so many Members of this Court subscribe to
a theory of federalism that rejects "the details of any particular
federalist doctrine"--which it says can and should "change to reflect the Nation's changing needs"--and that puts forward as the
only "unchanging goal" of federalism worth mentioning "the protection of liberty," which it believes is most directly achieved by
"promoting the sharingo among citizens of governmental decisionmaking authority ....

That statement should not be ignored. Justice Scalia

was "alarmed"--alarmed!-by a view that our governmental system, including division of power between state and
federal government, was intended to protect liberty. He is
alarmed (!) that our constitutional system should be viewed
as promoting the empowerment of citizens. If these textbook characteristics of democracy are not the purpose of our
federal system and Constitution generally, what is? It
would seem the purpose is to preserve to the States their
"dignity" as "persons."
As explicit as Justice Scalia's Hegelian view of the state
may be, the Alden Court, unfettered by any constitutional
299. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 310 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
300. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
301. 301 U.S. 389 (1937).

302. 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
303. College Say. Bank (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. at 689-90 (quoting id. at
702-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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text in making its decision, could make its reliance on its
Hegelian view of the state abundantly clear. For example,
Justice Kennedy wrote that states must be protected from
"'the indignity of subjecting a [nonconsenting] State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.'

,34

Again, the Court stated, "[The Constitution] reserves to
them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
inhering in that status. They... retain the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty." 5
Still again, the Court explained that the purpose of sovereign immunity was to protect" 'the dignity and respect afforded a State.' " As the dissent pointed out, the discussion of "respect and dignity" reflected Blackstone's
discussion of the royal dignity, of which Blackstone said:
First, then, of the royal dignity. Under every monarchical establishment, it is necessary to distinguish the prince from his subjects. . . . The law therefore ascribes to the king... certain attrib-

utes of a great and transcendent nature; by which the people are
led to consider him in the light of a superior being, and to pay him
that awful respect, which may enable
3 7 him with greater ease to
0
carry on the business of government.

The dissenters saw this as "inimical" to the republican

conception, which it certainly is.308 It also shows the pecu-

liarly Hegelian concept of the states upon which the Court
is operating; it certainly sees the state as in essence a
"great and transcendent.., superior being," a kind of person who can be respected, can be afforded dignity, and can
have rights.
It was easy for Hegel to view the state as a person with
rights as great as or greater than that of citizens without
creating any discomfort with his political views, as Hegel
was not a democrat." 9 It is not so easy, however, for the
304. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
at 505) (emphasis added).
305. Id. at 714-15 (emphasis added).
306. Id. at 749 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,
268 (1997)) (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 802 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES

*241).

308. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
309. See, e.g., EBENSTEIN, supranote 34, at 620 ('Taken without its monarch
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Court to ignore democratic theory, as well as the view that,
in the theory of the United States Constitution, "We the
People" are the ultimate sovereign, with the power to establish and disestablish governments.31 ° That phrase, "We
the People," shows the false assumptions Justice Kennedy
made in Alden. The states are not the primarily sovereignm
Only the people are. To some extent, the Court tries to
avoid the conflict between state "rights" and popular sovereignty by adopting Hegel's identification of popular sovereignty with the sovereignty of the state. Hegel wrote, "We
may also speak of sovereignty in home affairs residing in
the people, provided that we are speaking generally about
the whole state and meaning only what was shown above,
namely, that it is to the state that sovereignty belongs."31 '
Justice Scalia at times comes closest to stating this
view, that the popular sovereignty exists only in the sense
that the state embodies the people, for instance when he excoriates the dissenting opinion in the Lanham Act version
of College Savings Bank. In response to the dissent's proposition that if the people are the ultimate sovereigns, then
the promotion of popular participation in governmental decision-making (that is, a rather uncontroversial definition of
democracy), Justice Scalia wrote, "The proposition that 'the
protection of liberty' is most directly achieved by 'promoting
the sharing among citizens of governmental decisionmaking authority' might well have dropped from the lips of
Robespierre, but sureky not from those of Madison, Jefferson, or Hamilton ....
Justice Scalia quite clearly considers comparison with
Roberspierre an insult and an indication that sovereignty of
the people will yield Hegel's "formless mass" and even, perhaps, a reign of terror with a guillotine.
Justice Kennedy is less willing to abandon democracy
and resolves the dilemma of popular sovereignty another
way-by taking an exceptionally romantic view of the state.
His view is not one to allow empirical evidence to interfere,
either. That romantic view is ironically apparent when the
and the articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state.").
310. U.S. CONST. preamble.

311. EBENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 619.
312. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999) (quoting id. at 702-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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Justice wrote:
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The
good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made
in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
3 13
Land.

That language strikes one either as touchingly naive or
strangely cynical in the context of the decision in which it
arose. After all, Alden was about a state which did in fact
refuse to obey the binding laws of the United States that it
pay workers overtime; and that state then hid behind sovereign immunity in order to keep refusing to obey binding
laws of the United States-and hurt its citizens who happened to be its employees in the process.
Given this romantic ideal of the state, it is not surprising that Justice Kennedy avoids the popular sovereignty
dilemma by assuming that the state is politically accountable to the people in all its actions and that all its actions
reflect popular will. When reading how he does so, bear in
mind the state decision he is discussing is the decision not
to pay overtime to its employees, despite their expectation
that they had earned it:
When the Federal Government asserts authority over a State's
most fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of the
political accountability so essential to our liberty and republican
form of government. The asserted authority would blur not only
the distinct responsibilities of the State and National Governments but also the separate duties of the judicial and political
branches of the state governments, displacing "state decisions that
'go to the heart of representative government.' 314

In other words, if a state violates the federally protected
rights of individuals-for that is what these cases are
about, the rights of the plaintiffs, not the federal-state balance of power-that decision by the state is part and parcel
of representative government. It is the people themselves
acting.
By transferring a case about a government depriving it
313. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
314. Id. at 751 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)) (citation omitted).
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citizens of their wages into a case supposedly about a state's
"representative processes," which are supposedly under federal attack, the Court was able to ignore the tension between popular sovereignty and the "dignity" of the state.
Still more, the Court was able to misrepresent which party
was the underdog. The Court was able to pretend that in a
dispute between the state and underpaid probation officers
it was the state which was the oppressed party.
3. PretendingGoliath is David. The Court's Hegelian
conception of the state leads to some peculiar statements
that reflect a strong romantic attachment to a vision of the
state unconnected to empirical events. For instance, in
Alden, Justice Kennedy wrote, "The Constitution thus
contemplates that a State's government will represent and
remain accountable to its own citizens. When the Federal
Government asserts authority over a State's most
fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of
the political accountability so essential to our liberty and
republican form of government." 15
Again, the same Court states that "the balance between
competing interests must be reached after deliberation by
the political processes established by the citizens of the
State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen." 16 With such
high-sounding phrases, one could easily forget the Court is
talking about a state decision to cheat workers out of overtime pay. Alden did not concern the federal government asserting its authority. The federal government has innumerable ways to do that, including lawsuits in its own name
against the states. Alden concerned citizens invoking their
rights. If the federal law granting that right is valid, and if
the state is bound to follow it, then Alden is about a state
decision to break the law. Is deciding to break the law a
"fundamental political process?" Is a citizen's attempt to
hold the state accountable for its illegal action "striking at
the heart of political accountability?" It is hard to see how
that could be the case.
Even 200 years ago there was never a dispute about the
federal government's power to assert its supremacy. As the
Alden Court acknowledged, states always have been ame315. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
316. Id.
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nable to the federal government's suit against them in the
federal government's own courts. 17 Any government-togovernment disputes not only have been subject to resolution, but resolution in the courts where the federal government had "home court advantage." At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, however, few of the grants of power
to the federal government involved an affirmative power to
protect individual persons directly.318 One must not overlook
the practical effect of the Court's three opinions: states are
allowed to sell products in the marketplace, and lie about
what they sell (the Lanham Act case); they are allowed to
copy other people's patented products and sell them (the
Patent Act case); and they are allowed to hire employees for
an hourly wage, employees who believe that like all other
employees they are entitled to time and a half for overtime,
and then the states can cheat these workers out of that
wage (Alden). To read the Court's opinions, however, one
would nearly forget that it was these wronged private parties who were trying to sue, so much does the Court try to
talk about the overbearing federal government.
The romantic view of states as somehow more politically accountable than the federal government seems to be
a holdover from a different era that does not reflect modern
realities. Most states have huge populations; California and
New York, for instance, have tens of millions of residents.
These state governments are not by any stretch of the
imagination comparable to a New England town meeting of
any other paradigm of small and readily accountable grassroots democracy. Moreover, voting patterns show that fewer
voters vote in state elections as opposed to federal elections,
making state and local governments even less the actual
representative of the electorate. Furthermore, the states
themselves have arbitrary boundaries that do not reflect
any sort of natural community. Many metropolitan areasfor example, New York City and Philadelphia-are located
near the conjunction of state lines, and those multi-state
metropolitan areas form more of a natural political commu317. See id. at 755-56. Justice Kennedy suggests such suits against the
"dignity" of the states are allowed because the United States will show "the exercise of political responsibility," a "control which is absent" from those pesky
and irresponsible suits by private citizens trying to hold government accountable for the harm it has done them. Id. at 756.
318. One exception being, rather ironically, the control of patents. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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nity than does joining the city with the rest of the state not
part of that metropolitan area.
Political accountability is critically important. Decentralization is often both more democratic and more efficient.
Very little evidence exists, however, that federalism serves
either the ends of increased accountability or effective decentralization. Romantic dreams to the contrary should not
obscure that fact.
These cases do not concern the ability of states to be
politically accountable but the rights of individuals the
state has harmed. The state may disagree with the extent
of right the federal government has created for a class of
individuals; it may feel that creating the expectation of
overtime payments for overtime work is an inappropriate
balance of the competing interests between employer and
employee. That dispute, however, is not about political accountability, as both federal and state governments have
that to about the same extent. It is a dispute about whether
one level of government, the federal, has the right to strike
that balance rather than the state.
Justice Kennedy admitted that while "[t]his case at one
level concerns the formal structure of federalism, but in a
Constitution as resilient as ours form mirrors substance."319
The question of form is what suits may be allowed in what
courts, but the question of substance is what rights the federal government may protect. The real question is whether
the federal government has the power to regulate the terms
and conditions of employment, or to regulate advertising
behavior, or to protect patents. If that is properly the federal government's role in our federal structure, then anyone
who violates those federally-protected rights should be liable to being held responsible for doing so.
III. ROMANCING THE STATES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Near the end of his opinion in Alden, Justice Kennedy
attempted to assure his readership that the non-textual, extremely broad sovereign immunity the Court has granted to
the states would not utterly destroy the rule of law. He
mentioned the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 320 and the doc-

319. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758.
320. See id. at 757.
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trine that allows lesser state entities to be sued,3 21 to show

that some relief could be had-although the Court has severely weakened the Young doctrine, and the latter doctrine
only means that some illegal state actions can be remedied
but others cannot. Yet both these doctrines are acknowledged fictions. 22 One would think that it would trouble him,
or any other state sovereignty devotee, that the doctrine
they trumpet is so harsh that illogical fictions must be created to soften the blow.
He also mentions the doctrine of waiver, which is an
odd thing to bring up in a case in which a state most emphatically did not choose to waive its immunity, one of three
decided the same day in which states refused to waive their
immunity. Justice Kennedy's basic point, however, inspires
the least confidence of all:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomi-

tant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. The
States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the
Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse
to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States. The good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."3 2

Justice Kennedy says the Court is unwilling to assume
that the states will not honor their oaths to the Constitution, in the face of three cases decided the same day in
which it was alleged that states chose to violate federal law.
Justice Kennedy's pious belief in the good faith of states in
that case exhibits the highest degree of romanticism, a
commitment to a pretty ideal against which the mundane
world of empirical fact cannot prevail. For those of us who
care about the world of fact, however, we recognize that
even if most of the time most state officials may act in good
faith, there is clearly a need to protect ourselves from those
321. See id. at 756.
322. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (Ex
parte Young rests on fiction); see also that opinion's discussion of § 1983 cases,
where at one and the same time a municipality is "not the state," but its actions
are "state actions."
323. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
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times when the states fail to do so. Alden v. Maine shows
that the possibility of a state refusing to allow a claim to be
made against it for its apparent violations of federal law is
far from hypothetical. Indeed, some states have not waived
their sovereign immunity in their own courts for any action
whatsoever,3' and others have limited such waiver to very
specific actions.2 5
These cases illustrate that the Eleventh Amendment,
state sovereign immunity, or indeed any issue that concerns
the "sovereignty" of a political entity cannot be dismissed
simply as a matter of "federalism" 3 6 with its implications of
being simply a matter of federal-state relations, or federalstate-tribal relations. All these cases concern not only the
division of "sovereignty" of state and federal governments
but the sovereignty of the people themselves. To use an oldfashioned word, these cases affect our personal liberties.
Cleaning up the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine
completely requires going all the way back to Hans v. Louisiana and starting over. That may sound too radical for a
profession that values stability, as law values stare decisis.
Yet stare decisis has never been an overwhelming stumbling block in Eleventh Amendment cases. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Seminole Tribe, "when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent.' Our willingness
to reconsider our earlier decision has been 'particularly true
in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction
through legislative action is practically impossible." ,327
324. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-60 (1991) (stating that claims may only be
brought administratively); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (stating that "the State of
West Virginia shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity").
325. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1998) (waiving immunity in
tort claims only for injuries resulting from operation of a motor vehicle, operation of a public hospital or a correctional facility, the dangerous condition of
public building, the dangerous condition of a public highway or road, a dangerous condition caused by snow or ice, or from the operation of any public utility
facility); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1999) (stating that a waiver of immunity is invalid when loss arises from state employee who exercises due care or
performance or failure to perform discretionary duty); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 5-522(a)(5) (1998) (stating that immunity is not waived if a claim
from a single occurrence exceeds $100,000).
326. However, that is how Justice Scalia sees it. See College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (Lanham Act), 527 U.S. 666,
688-89 (1999) (characterizing sovereignty as a matter of federalism).
327. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (citations omit-

ted).
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Of course, Hans need not be overruled bluntly; as we
learned from Parden,it can be reinterpreted to have been in
fact a suit that did not really involve a federal question.
Moreover, one could interpret the Eleventh Amendment
contextually and still nod to precedent by finding that,
given the need to balance federal and state interests, a federal question suit against a state could only be brought if
Congress specifically authorized it. Although such an additional layer to the text of the Eleventh Amendment is not
authorized by the text, it could be justified as a reasonable
rule of prudence when dealing with matters as politically
sensitive as these cases seem to the Court to be. 2 8
IV. ON READING THE CONSTITUTION: SOME CONCLUDING

THOUGHTS

All three opinions decided on June 23, 1999, were
grounded in the sentiment that the Constitution itself, the
written document to which all have access, is irrelevant;
rather, only the presuppositions of some unidentified individuals knows as the "founders" matter. For purposes of
this article, others can argue about who those founders
might have been, whether it is possible to know what their
presuppositions were or whether in fact all the relevant
founders even had similar presuppositions; whether if such
presuppositions are discoverable that task is best served by
lawyers and judges rather than trained historians; and
whether the Court has done an adequate job of discovering
those presuppositions. This article focused on another question, which is why we today should effectuate the presuppositions that are not in fact written into the text. The "founders" lived in a different world than ours; but fortunately,
they were wise enough not to bind us to their world view.
They bound us to a written text, rather short, in many
places quite open-ended, which provides both stability and
328. While suits against states may have been political hot potatoes two
centuries ago, it is the author's sense that the general political mood at the beginning of the tventy-first century finds such suits perfectly acceptable. An informal poll taken among the author's acquaintances, including many practicing
lawyers who have forgotten most of their constitutional law courses over the
years of practice, has shown that nearly all of them believed such suits were an
everyday occurrence, and did not seem disturbed by that fact. The author's
sample group included persons active in Republican party politics, presumably
the persons most likely to support states' rights.
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flexibility, The Court's current interpretive style provides
neither.
The "founders' understanding" upon which the Court
relies, and for which the Court purports to search, is not
discovered after careful historical analysis, but rather is the
Court's own romantic construct.
As lawyers, the only original intent, or indeed legislative intent of any sort, which we are competent to divine is
that expressed in the adopted texts-the words themselves,
in conjunction with the way the clauses in question interact
with and are illuminated by other parts of the text, in comparison with other, similar texts on the same topic. Moreover, that intent-what is expressed in the adopted texts-is
the only intent the drafters have a right to impose on the
future. If the only way a certain text could muster enough
votes to be adopted is to leave out the expression of particular results which the sponsors would have liked to see,
those particular results were not adopted. If a clause only
found acceptance because of a studied ambiguity which obfuscates the drafter's intent, a later court cannot resolve
that ambiguity by reference to the drafter's intent outside
the text, for that would impose a meaning that was likely
opposed by many who voted for the clause's adoption.
The Court's refusal to be bound by the text but rather
the spirit of the text is not a neutral procedural choice. It
serves a substantive vision of the Constitution, one which
identifies "sovereignty" as belonging the governments, not
the people to whom those governments purport to be accountable, and one which values "sovereign dignity"29 over
that accountability. The choices the Court made at the end
of its last term already have had significant fallout in reducing states accountability to their citizens. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found
that states cannot be called into account for violating their
employees' rights under the Americans with Disabilities
Act."' ° That same court has also found that states cannot be
brought to account for violating the Individuals with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, at least not by the
persons who were injured by that violation.3 ' Furthermore,

329.
dignity,
330.
331.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (noting that states "retain the
though not the full authority, of sovereignty").
See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999).
See Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1999).
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a court that was considering whether to allow suits against
state agencies who were delegated federal power to regulate
interconnections between local telephone companies for
failing to use that delegated federal power properly has
held that
even that suit is barred by the Eleventh Amend33 2
ment.

These will not be the last decisions granting states immunity from suit, wreaking havoc with federal regulatory
schemes and private parties' federally protected rights.
This article began with the assertion that the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is caught in a
trap of the Court's own making. The first part of that trap
was identified as an increased empowerment of the states
at the expense of their accountability to the "people." That
result appears to be a trap to the author but may not appear so to the Court; it may well seem to the Court an appropriate division of power. On the other hand, the second
part of the trap ought to be problematic for the Court-that
being the trap that arises from the romantic reading of the
amendment, which caused justices who decry judicial activism to ignore the written Constitution to forge their own.
The first step out of that trap might be to show some intellectual honesty and admit that "romantic reading" is not a
reading of the text at all. In other words, the Court could
begin by admitting that, in explicitly disavowing the text of
the Eleventh Amendment as a meaningful source of state
immunity, it is disavowing the Eleventh Amendment altogether as a guide to deciding the balance between state
power and accountability. That is to say, the Court, at least
on this point, must admit that it finds the Constitution irrelevant.
The Court's decisions on state immunity are constitutional law because they concern the fundamental constitutive elements of our political/legal system, but they are not
Constitutional law. 3 To end the trap of the romantic reading, the Court must admit that, at least on some issues, it
no longer finds the Constitution applicable; rather, it relies
on certain political principles it believes were important to
some people at the time the nation was constituted. In turn,
332. See Wisconsin Bell v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 57 F. Supp.2d 710
(D.Wis. 1999).
333. See supra pp. 489-91 for a comparison of the terms "constitutional law"
and "Constitutional law."
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the Court might admit that in fact it is applying principles
it finds congenial, irrespective of the Constitution. That, in
turn, might force the Court to confront its relationship with
the entire text of the Constitution and with the notion of
constitutional principles (some of which might be external
to the text entirely).
What would happen if the Court admitted its state sovereign immunity law was not about the United States Constitution at all. No one knows. The debate about state sovereign immunity, however, would be more honest. The
author chooses to believe that an honest debate would produce a more useful and democratic resolution to this and
other questions of power and accountability.

